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Abstract            
With the judicial system worldwide investigating finance companies for misleading disclosures, 
deception has become a topical issue. However, deception is an area that has historically not been 
favoured in academia. The paper aims to determine whether disclosure practices of failed 
companies show more characteristics of deception than those of viable companies. The research 
will involve a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, including the use of content 
analysis and the software DICTION. An index of deception is constructed. The higher the deception 
score, the more deceptive the authors are deemed to be. This study tests this argument with respect 
to the prospectuses of a sample of failed and non-failed New Zealand finance companies. 
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1. Introduction          
For financial reports to provide value, they must assist the decision making of users. Users cannot 
be expected to base decisions on company documents if they do not find them to be relevant, 
reliable, comparable, and most importantly, understandable (Smith, 1996). However, whether this 
can be accomplished is another question (Bolívar, Pérez, & Hernández, 2006). This is particularly 
the case with prospectuses, which contain both historic and forward-looking financial information. 
The New Zealand Securities Commission raised concerns in 2004 that prospectuses and investment 
statements have become too compliance-based, often at the expense of users’ understanding 
(Securities Commission, 2004). When investors lack understanding of the technicalities of the 
registered prospectuses, which at times can extend up to hundreds of pages, they often turn to the 
most easily digestible section: the chairman’s’ or managing director’s letters to the investors. 
However, these sections are unaudited, discretionary and consequently susceptible to strategic 
communication. This is an area that has been highly neglected in literature. Company 
communication with investors can shape the decisions taken by investors. If optimistic news is 
portrayed, investors may react more positively than expected (Henry 2008). However, negative 
news may spark a reduction in investor confidence, leading to more unfavourable outcomes. Yuthas, 
Rogers, and Dillard (2002) are of the view that poor earnings and other unfavourable information 
may be detrimental to a corporation’s image, so incentives arise to suppress this information, or 
portray it in a positive light.  
Herein lies the importance of corporate disclosures. In the event of a corporate failure, the welfare 
of investors in finance companies, such as debenture holders with respect to invested principal and 
accrued interest, is at stake. There is no guarantee that either would be returned. Historically the 
return of their initial deposit in the event of a failure is quite low. In times of financial distress, the 
need for information is greater, due to higher levels of uncertainty (Coats & Fant, 1993). However 
in such times, the question of whether management has the incentive to provide unbiased truthful 
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disclosures is raised. What happens if investors cannot realistically take such information at face 
value? Are investors capable of making the distinction between truth and fiction on their own? The 
United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) once stated that “market forces alone are 
insufficient to cause all material information to be disclosed” (as cited in Chow et al. 1996). This 
signals its scepticism about firms providing disclosures on their own accord without the extra 
encouragement from regulation. However, information is essential for the effective and efficient 
operation of the capital market (Rezaee, 2005). Information asymmetry leads to adverse selection, 
agency problems, and greater yet, the possible breakdown of market forces (Cooper & Keim 1983). 
The recent meltdown of the finance sector worldwide has sparked controversy about whether full 
disclosure was afforded to investors: why did investors not adjust their decisions accordingly? 
Prior literature throws little light on this question. Empirical studies fail to provide support for the 
notion that an equilibrium of full disclosure can be achieved, but they do not refute the notion either. 
Existing research such as studies by Holder-Webb and Cohen (2007) and Altman (1983) are 
harmonious in the recognition of the overall impact of financial distress on disclosure. However, 
there are some divergences over the timing of disclosures, and the underlying motivations of 
corporations to provide disclosures. Hess and Feng (2007) could not find evidence that supported 
investors ‘rewarding’ firms for disclosures by offering relatively lower interest rates. Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990) have found evidence that the clarity of annual reports becomes impaired as the 
company becomes financially distressed, possibly in an attempt to distort its underlying message. 
This contradicts with Yuthas et al. (2002) who found evidence that disclosures of both distressed 
and non-disclosed firms displayed characteristics relating to ‘good’ communication (i.e. the 
Habermasian principles) 1 . Verrecchia (1990) sums up the argument nicely by stating that 
disclosures provide information to aid decision making regarding asset values, and in the case of 
                                                 
1
 The Habermasian principle of ‘good’ communication requires the communicators to be comprehensible, truthful, 
sincere and legitimate (Yuthas et al., 2002). 
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non-disclosures, it shows insights into managements’ motivations. However, it is duly noted that 
this assumes readers have the ability to detect non-disclosure and deceptive disclosure.  
Deception in corporate reporting from a narrative context is a topic that is still relatively fresh in 
accounting literature. The current lack of research does little to help us predict fraudulent 
communication, or even whether deception can be predicted from an analysis of narratives (Purda 
& Skillicorn, 2012). However, it is not a new phenomenon in our society. People are inherently 
poor lie detectors due to their tendency to be biased towards the truth (Carlson, George, Burgoon, 
Adkins, & White, 2004). It is said that it is “difficult if not impossible” to identify fraudulent 
practices in financial reporting, even for sophisticated users (Hobson, Mayew, & Venkatachalam, 
2011 p.1). In some cases, this may be lower than chance (Wang & Wang, 2012). However, there is 
limited research relating to deception in terms of accounting narratives, with most research focusing 
on more obvious forms of fraud, such as  accounting treatment (Baker, 2003; Gordon, 2002; Leach, 
Newsom, & Newsom, 2007; Scharff, 2005). Carlson et al., (2004) argue that this is largely 
attributable to the difficulties in detecting deception as there is not a single indicative behaviour that 
can characterise a person to be ‘deceptive’.  
This study undertakes a content analysis of selected communications in the prospectuses of a 
sample of failed and non-failed finance companies in New Zealand in order to examine the relative 
use of deceptive language. The study employs DICTION, a computer assisted text analysis 
programme, to count the frequencies of relevant words associated with deception. The paper 
focuses on five common traits or ‘cues’ of deception to form a ‘deception score’. The five 
components of the deception score are the use of personal pronouns, negative emotive words, 
descriptive words, exclusion and causation words, and use of uncertain words.   
8 
  
The next chapter explains the contributions the current study will bring, followed by a review of 
current literature. An explanation of the hypotheses tested is described in chapter four, followed by 
the methodology in chapter five and results in chapter six. A discussion of the results is shown in 
chapter seven and a conclusion follows in chapter eight. 
  
9 
  
2.  Contribution          
Despite the economic and financial market meltdowns over the past half century, there are 
startlingly few papers examining the role deception has played in corporate collapses. In times of 
financial distress, firms may not feel rewarded by telling the truth, and fear being ‘punished’, as full 
disclosure may be “suicidal” (Jorgenson, 2004 p.1). Therefore, deceptive disclosures may be 
“inevitable” when a company is under financial distress (Myers, 1977 p. 159). This represents a 
significant gap in literature considering the importance of corporate disclosures to investors.  
The paper makes several important contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the sparse field of 
deception from an accounting narrative perspective, and secondly, to the existing limited literature 
concerning narrative disclosures of media other than annual reports. Specifically, this study 
examines deception in narratives of selected communications contained in registered prospectuses. 
The paper further contributes to existing literature by examining deception on a medium targeting 
more than one party. As the registered prospectuses are distributed to existing and prospective 
investors, the context of multiple users may call for differing assumptions than with a single user, as 
popularly discussed in prior literature. Such assumptions include the reactions of readers and 
subsequent deceptive strategies in word choices. As there isn’t a single indicator that defines 
deceptive behaviour, multiple measures of deception were used. With the benefit of hindsight and 
knowing which firms did in fact produce deceptive disclosures, we may be able to provide support 
for tell-tale signs of deceptive behaviour alluded to by prior literature. However, prior literature has 
not found enough support for deception in the field of written disclosures, where the same 
assumptions may not hold.  We also illustrated how automated linguistic tools such as DICTION 
can help analyse possible indicators of deception in the narratives. 
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Corporate disclosure documents are the key to efficient allocation of resources in society, and help 
keep the capital markets functioning (Rezaee, 2005). However, for investors of finance companies 
(a form of Non-Bank Deposit Takers (NBDT) under New Zealand Securities legislation), the most 
relevant corporate disclosure may not necessarily be the annual report, which has often been the 
focus of past studies. Rather it may be the registered prospectus. Although highly important, 
registered prospectuses have not previously been given much academic attention. Part of the reason 
is the prominence of the narrative portion in prospectuses. While such the narrative portion usually 
provide important information, they are subjective by nature and therefore often only play a 
supporting role in terms of external scrutiny (Tennyson, Ingram, & Dugan, 1990). There are also 
generally few or no guidelines specifying the contents of narrative disclosures (Yuthas et al., 2002). 
This is especially so in comparison to rigid accounting standards governing the financial statements. 
Important to this thesis is the fact there is scant research dedicated specifically to firms with 
uncertain financial health and future, as the underlying assumption of most of the papers is that the 
firm is stable or growing (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr, 2003). Boo and Simnett (2002) agree, 
questioning whether studies done on healthy companies are comparable with their financially 
distressed counterparts. The author posits that studies of companies in financial distress should be 
given consideration by academics as companies operating under unstable financial conditions will 
have different incentives and motivations to provide disclosures. A sound understanding of 
deception in narrative disclosures and the motivations behind it could help prevent investors making 
unprofitable investment decisions and build a stable foundation for a sector, the finance sector for 
instance, which is trying to re-emerge from its failure. A stable foundation can help rekindle the 
confidence that has been lost in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The revival of the finance sector 
is fundamental for any society, as it constitutes a significant proportion of the economy. In New 
Zealand, the dollar amount of this was approximately $377 billion2 of the entire New Zealand 
economy for the year ending 30 June 2010 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2011b).  
                                                 
2
 All monetary figures are stated in New Zealand Dollars, unless otherwise stated. 
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3. Review of prior literature           
On the 13th of December 2006, Roger Moses, the then Chairman of failed finance company Nathans 
Finance, wrote in the company’s registered prospectus No. 8: “The Board has confidence that 
Nathans will continue to be well placed to capitalise on the emerging strategic growth opportunities.” 
Despite this, the company was placed under receivership in August 2007, and in its demise, $174 
million in deposits were lost from the New Zealand economy (JDJL Limited, 2011b). Unfortunately, 
the case of Nathans Finance was only one of many. As of 4th October 2011, the “Deep Freeze list”3 
reports no less than 63 failures of NBDTs 4  (includes the more commonly known ‘finance 
companies’, building societies and credit unions), now in moratorium5, receivership or liquidation. 
There are many factors speculated to have triggered the meltdown in the financial markets. In 2006, 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) hit, leaving a damaged world economy hanging on its hinges. 
The collapse has been particularly severe in the finance sector worldwide. By the beginning of 2011, 
the collapse of the finance sector in New Zealand had cost the country’s economy $3.112 billion 
(JDJL Limited, 2011b) and damage to confidence in the sector that possibly can never be repaired 
(KPMG, 2008). The ‘blame-game’ often follows in the aftermath of such widespread financial 
carnage, in which internal factors such as the incompetency of management are focused upon 
(Altman, 1983). In the wake of the GFC a question that might reasonably be asked by investors of 
such entities is often: did the directors deceive in their statements?  
The scenario described above has played out on a wider scale in other jurisdictions. Since the GFC, 
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) has commenced 235 investigations 
on companies allegedly making misleading statements (D’Aloisio, 2010, November).  Using the 
                                                 
3
 From interest.co.nz, an organisation providing free online market data and is independent of any financial advisors and 
institutions (JDJL Limited, 2011a). 
4
 Although the full ‘deep freeze’ list reports 63 failed NBDTs, not all of the deposit takers included narrative portions in 
their registered prospectuses. Due to the restriction of available information, the current study examines 33 of the 63 
firms. 
5
 Companies placed in moratorium leave investors two with choices: forgoing interest or principal repayments (or both) 
for a period of time or a receivership. This allows management to realise assets on an orderly basis and is likely to 
achieve a better return for investors than a receiver (Joblin, 2009).  
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benefit of hindsight, investors (Macfie, 2010) and the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) (FMA, 
2011a) are now questioning whether companies were being entirely truthful in their 
communications with shareholders. At the centre of these investigations were disclosures prepared 
by the companies to the shareholders and debenture holders from their registered prospectuses and 
annual reports. It is no secret that unsophisticated investors,6 who make up a large proportion of 
investors, find it difficult to dissect and understand corporate financial disclosures (Balata & Breton, 
2005). With the introduction of complex accounting standards and onerous financial legislation, 
some investors find the chasm between their understanding of financial information and ‘reality’ to 
be widened. In such times, narrative disclosures written in plain English seem to offer a ‘ray of 
hope’ (Jones, 1994). The study by Yuthas et al., (2002) explored some roles deception may play in 
narrative disclosures. They found that the narrative component in annual reports can help enhance 
the company’s trustworthiness, even if their other capabilities, such as their operating activities, 
become suspect.  
3.1 The continuum of disclosure practices   
An organisation has an array of disclosure strategies in its arsenal. This may vary from full 
disclosure of its activities to no disclosures at all. However, the disclosure of misleading 
information is seen as more destructive than non-disclosure, and is therefore at the negative extreme 
of the continuum.  
Although the study examined unlisted finance companies, which consequently will not have the 
same analyst following as finance companies listed on a share exchange, the same assumptions 
regarding disclosure strategies may still apply. 
                                                 
6
 A usual proxy of investor sophistication is institutional ownership (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, & Krinsky, 2000). 
Therefore ‘unsophisticated’ investors are those not part of an institution (e.g. normal ‘mum and dad’ type investors). 
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3.1.1 The first scenario - timely voluntary and true disclosures 
Narrative disclosures are very valuable as they can overcome some information asymmetry 
problems (Smith and Taffler, 1992). Firms may either voluntarily disclose unfavourable 
information on a timely basis or withhold the information. The determining factor in the decision is 
the perceived reaction that is likely from the market (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009), and the 
resulting effect on the firm’s share prices (Trueman, 1986). Milgrom (1981) strongly advocates 
voluntary disclosures, as non-disclosure is usually interpreted as the worst case scenario, and this 
assumption will badly reflect investors’ perceptions of asset prices. Assuming there are no costs to 
disclosure, it would be in the firm’s best interest to disclose both good and bad news, for the sake of 
firm value (Chow, Haddad, & Hirst, 1996). Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that, as shareholders can 
replace personnel for the company’s poor performance, management has the incentive to provide 
disclosure to correct mispricing of shares and thus defensively explain poor performance. Graham 
et al, (2005) had similar findings, suggesting that if directors fail to achieve projected earnings per 
share, this is a tale-tell sign of poor management. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) found a positive 
relationship between disclosure and investors’ reactions in which less sophisticated investors 
benefit from quality disclosures. This is generally in the form of easily digestible narrative 
disclosures. In Collett and Hrasky (2005) there is support that managers make disclosure decisions 
in an attempt to take advantage of more favourable terms from capital suppliers. Voluntary 
disclosures could be used to management’s own advantage: as a defensive mechanism or to signal 
its talent to the market. 
Timely disclosure of both good and bad news indicates that managers have the ability to anticipate 
the future changes of the firm, thus increasing their compensation and reputation. Lack of disclosure 
leads the market to think that the firm has bad news, which prompts management to provide timely 
disclosures (Trueman, 1986). Bad news is usually anticipated by investors and their expectations 
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are already reflected by the share prices (Frino, Jones, & Wong, 2007; Morris, 1997). If this is the 
case, bad news therefore should not be ‘new’ news to investors and thus there is no reason for 
disclosures of bad news to be delayed. Frost (1997) provides support for this claim stating that, 
based on the 81 firms he studied, distressed firms tend to be open about disclosure of their negative 
news. The rationale is that if the market is efficient, then signs of impending distress are often clear. 
For example, through the decrease or omission of dividends (DeAngelo &  DeAngelo, 1990). More 
importantly, bad news often sounds ‘better’ coming from the firms themselves in a timely manner 
(Frost, 1997). In Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal’s (2005), 76.8% of respondents agreed with the 
proposition that, on top of sounding better, timely disclosures also potentially mitigate litigation. 
Timely disclosure is also a chance for management to explain poor performance to prevent 
shareholders holding management responsible and taking corrective action themselves (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that by adopting timely disclosure practices, 
firms can attract a greater analyst following, improve accuracy of market expectations and reduce 
information asymmetry. This will bring in benefits for the firm as this may lead to an overall 
reduction in cost of capital.  
3.1.2  The second scenario: untimely unfavourable disclosures 
In section 3.1.1 we looked at the rationales for companies to provide upfront disclosure of 
unfavourable behaviour. However, a competing argument states that, given the adverse impact on 
share prices, management has incentive to withhold the disclosure of unfavourable news (Kothari et 
al., 2009). Management’s self-interest, whether directly through compensation or indirectly through 
ownership schemes, affects both the extent and integrity of disclosures (Donoher, Reed, & Storrud-
Barnes, 2007; Kothari et al., 2009). Smith and Taffler (1992) found evidence that the readability of 
narrative sections of financially unsound companies often deteriorates with declining performance. 
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) acknowledge that disclosures can help investors evaluate a firm’s 
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value but can also adversely impact on the firm by informing competitors of the firm’s strategic 
competitive position. Graham et al, (2005) and Healy and Palepu (2001), both find fear of setting 
the “disclosure precedent”7 may reduce the incentive to provide forward-looking disclosures. This 
is because legal liabilities may result if management fails to achieve what it announced it would do. 
Firms that were described as most likely to provide inadequate disclosures are those that are 
generally less profitable, as they want to hide the reasons they are not performing (Singhvi & Desai, 
1971). Firms with relatively poor prospects and performance usually do not disclose the full extent 
of their relative position in the market (Penman, 1980) as this increases uncertainty, which is 
detrimental to their relatively higher default and bankruptcy risk (Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007). 
These findings support the notion that firms with unfavourable news are more likely to distort their 
communication, if given the opportunity. This supports the standard agency perspective. The 
incidence of information asymmetry provides opportunities for management to withhold or distort 
such disclosure. After all, market forces alone cannot sway them to disclose voluntarily (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 1977). However, this ability to delay bad news has somewhat 
diminished with the introduction of continuous disclosure regulations in the United States (Kothari 
et al., 2009). New Zealand has developed similar disclosure requirements, which are set out in the 
Securities Market Act and the NZX listing rules (New Zealand Stock Exchange, 2009). However, 
lax policing by financial market watchdogs, which has been suspected both internationally and 
domestically (MacKay, 2010; McConvill, 2006; Proimos, 2005) is likely to reduce the extent of 
complete and timely disclosures, though this is yet unproven. Research into the New Zealand 
context is therefore also very valuable.  
                                                 
7
 Management’s unwillingness to be bounded by what it has disclosed (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). 
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3.1.3  The most adverse scenario: manipulation of disclosures - deception 
Finally, at the end of the spectrum is the disclosure of false information – deception. Deception is a 
serious matter particularly in accounting. The disclosure of misleading information can also lead to 
poor investments decisions, resulting in the inappropriate allocation of resources (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007). This makes deception more harmful than non-disclosure.  
Accounting is viewed as “neutral” and “independent” (Evans, 2009). Having such perceived 
inherent qualities means accounting has possible influential powers over other forms of 
communication. However, disclosures by management are “self-serving”, depending on which 
information is disclosed (García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). ‘Misleading narrative 
disclosure’ is not a break-through concept. From the outright fraudulent comments made by Enron 
executives in the United States (Kroger, 2005), to unclear statements regarding related parties 
transactions made more locally by Bridgecorp directors (Financial Markets Authority, 2011a), both 
have the intention of misleading investors and regulators, and are therefore classed as deceptive 
disclosures. It is also suggested by investors and academics that, as the financial health of a 
company deteriorates, so too does the clarity of the annual reports, possibly as an attempt to focus 
investors’ attention away from poor performance (Jones, 1994). Although this seems to fit the 
description of ‘deception’, it is still a tricky word to define. Literally it means to intentionally 
mislead by providing false information (Pearsall & Hanks, 1998). Interestingly the definition does 
not include omissions of material information. However, prior literature seem to hint at a wider 
scope, including for example, partial disclosures such as subtle ‘half-truths’ (Langevoort, 1999). So 
why do companies feel they have a need to put a spin on their version of the truth? Why do they 
feel the need to deceive investors?  
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Prior literature provides a number of different theoretical perspectives to describe deceivers’ 
possible motives. The current study briefly discusses prospect theory, impression management and 
the Pollyanna effect8. The general assumption from these various theories is that deception is an 
intentional action done to achieve a desired outcome (Craig, Mortensen, & Iyer, 2012). Prospect 
theory describes investors’ perceived reactions towards positive news and provides reasoning that 
would explain the motivation for deception. When a corporation produces positive financial reports, 
these tend to cause investors to think more favourably about it than they would have if the reports 
had been unbiased (Henry, 2008). For financially distressed companies, to be perceived positively 
by the market may be crucial to their survival. The author describes one method as ‘subtle 
promotion’ – selectively reporting favourable information while withholding unfavourable 
information. This can include strategically deciding which comparative years to include, which 
GAAP principle to define earnings and the emphasis and placement of certain words. The 
misalignment between what management knows and how it frames that knowledge in the wording 
of its disclosure will distort the received meaning by users, thus highlighting the dangers of ‘half’ 
truths (Smith & Taffler, 1992).  
Social psychology offers ‘impression management’ as a possible motivation for deceptive 
behaviour. Hooghiemstra (2003) (as cited in Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007) defines impression 
management as “studying how individuals present themselves to others to be perceived favourably 
by others”. Under this assumption, deceivers will alter their written media depending on how they 
think they are or like to be perceived by the users of the reports. Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000) 
suggest that this is usually done with the intention to appeal to the readers. However, Abrahamson 
and Park (1994) and Smith and Taffler (2000) question the triumph of impression management, 
stating that there is no evidence indicating that differences between good and bad performance are 
                                                 
8
 ‘Pollyanna’ effect is the phenomenon when “positive, affirmative words [are] used more than negative words” 
(Hildebrandt and Snyder, 1981). The effect is said to be suppressed as the shareholding/ownership by directors 
increases (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) 
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successfully camouflaged. Rutherford (2005) supports this, arguing that subtle strategies of 
impression management such as those displaying characteristics of the Pollyanna effect may not be 
able to fool sophisticated users. Deumes (2008) provides an example of how the Pollyanna effect 
may impact on a firm’s disclosure strategy. If management is generally optimistic in its publications, 
this possible positive bias may mean that management is reluctant to provide effective warning 
signals for investors. However, what is omitted is usually just as important as what the management 
has chosen to present. Although the author could not find traces of positive bias, i.e. the Pollyanna 
effect, the companies in the studies were found to have been selective in what they were disclosing. 
Hildebrandt and Snyder (1981) found positive words to feature more often in annual reports of 
companies, regardless of their financial health. In contrast, Rutherford (2005) found evidence of the 
Pollyanna effect, with loss-making companies making more references to ‘profits’ than losses, and 
to the top line of the income statement (i.e. earnings). Boo and Simnett (2002) provide empirical 
evidence in support of the supposed benefits of the Pollyanna effect, thereby shedding some light as 
to why companies may want to compromise their competitive position. The authors found that 
financially distressed companies that provided optimistic management prospective comments were 
less likely to fail within the next year, in comparison to other financially distressed companies.  
Regardless, it would seem that overall, disclosures are intentional, and ultimately management will 
present information that is instrumental to achieving its goals (Erickson, Weber, & Segovia, 2011). 
However, the results of empirical research study do not suggest an association between 
manipulation in disclosure and negative performance (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). These 
authors conclude that disclosure strategies are generally used to benefit users by providing more 
information. There appears to be further disagreement in findings in prior literature. Stanton, 
Stanton, and Pires (2004) did not find support for the proposition that mangers can successfully 
manipulate the users’ perception through the use of narrative sections in their annual reports. 
However, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) claim that such conclusion should be “interpreted with 
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caution” (p.166), as content analysis of discretionary disclosures was not undertaken to determine 
which sections contain evidence of impression management.   
3.2 ‘Deception’ in detail 
Deception itself is difficult to define. It could be as direct as the fabrication of events to the more 
subtle forms such as ‘half-truths’ or vague statements (Carlson et al., 2004). All communication, 
whether truthful or deceptive, contains some element of self-presentation (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Drawing largely from studies in linguistics and psychology, the general consensus is that deception 
is “[a] message knowingly transmitted by the sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the 
receiver” (Buller & Burgoon, 2006 p.205). Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller, Burgoon, White, 
& Ebesu, 1994) assumes that, based on feedback by the receiver, deceivers will adapt their 
behaviour so as to not arouse suspicion. Under that assumption, deception in communications from 
senior management is expected to be discrete, subtle and the warning bells are generally only leaked 
subconsciously9. This is very plausible, as the emotions or cognitive load they experience, or their 
behavioural changes in attempts to appear more legitimate, are usually signs that give away their 
deceit (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005). 
Carlson et al. (2004) argue that language is an important ‘cue’10 to deception. It is with this cue to 
deception where we can find some traces or hints of deceptive behaviour. Wang and Wang (2012) 
are of the opinion that the truth may ultimately “leak out” of the deceiver’s state of mind, hence it is 
important to examine the language used to identify these subtle indications. Jameson (2000) asserts 
that unlike their high performing counterparts, firms in financial distress are more likely to lie. 
However, prior literature does not provide agreement on how being deceptive will impact the 
overall content of disclosures. On the one hand, the lack of certainty is a defining characteristic of 
                                                 
9
 For example, the former Chief Executive of Enron, Jeffery Skilling’s use of the term “Asshole” at the end of a 
response to an analyst in a nationally televised media forum. With hindsight the use of the word spelt the turning point 
in Enron’s fortunes, from rise to fall (Gibney, 2005). 
10
  In most deception literature, this refers to indicators, whether verbal or nonverbal. 
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deceptive communication, but there isn’t a definitive definition of the term deceptive 
communication. Hobson et al. (2011) is of particular interest. By looking at IPO prospectuses and 
other media releases, the authors conclude that financial misreporting varies on a scale that ranges 
from manipulation of items on the financial statement to the concealment of unfavourable news. 
They also find that the probability of misreporting is positively correlated with the use of ‘lying 
words’.  
The main body of deception literature comprises, among others, Hancock et al. (2005); Zhou et al. 
(2004); Keila and Skillicorn (2005); Larcker and Tayan (2010); Hancock et al. (2004); Newman, 
Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards (2003); and Hancock et al. (2008). Their major findings are: 
1. CEO communication can be a strategic medium for “self-presentation, self-reporting 
[and] …self-promotion of the president” (Bournois & Point, 2006 p.47). Fear of association 
plays a big part in the minds of the communicator, especially when addressing investors 
who are concerned about the future of the company. The use of personal pronouns such as “I” 
and “we” were found to be severely reduced in deceptive disclosures as the communicator 
does not want any responsibility over the news he or she is portraying. Case studies 
provided by Amernic and Craig (2006), reveal CEOs neglecting such language to distance 
themselves and limiting their accountability. Such words are found to be possible indicators 
of deception and even blame shifting (Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Zhou et al., 2004). 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) and Craig et al. (2012) also suggest expanding the 
definition of personal pronouns to both first person and singular personal pronouns to 
encompass more blame shifting behaviour. More generally, Morrow (2009) asserts that in 
the course of unfavourable situations, CEOs are “less likely to blame themselves” (p.20). 
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2. The choice of deception affects the inner psyche of everyone to some extent and in most 
cases the effect is indirect, such as on the words used by deceivers. Deceivers have been 
found to use more negative emotive words arising from the mental discomfort caused by 
betraying their conscience. Larcker and Zakolyukina (2011) also assert that the inward guilt 
and fear of exposure can affect their choice in use of negative words. Craig et al. (2012) 
describe the physical and mental discomfort experienced by deceivers from the stress of 
having their deceptive actions being found out. Hobson et al. (2011) find that executives 
who are suffering from “cognitive dissonance”11 will be more prone to convey negative 
news about their firm’s future performance. However, some authors found contradicting 
results. Larcker and Tayan (2010) argue that deceivers will tend to over-exaggerate positive 
news and discount negative news, thus suggesting a lower usage of negative words. 
3. There are views on whether deceivers will provide more or less information. On the one 
hand, in order to substantiate their version of events, deceivers are posited to be more 
expressive with their descriptions. Therefore, the excessive use of sensory descriptive words, 
such as “feels like”, “sounds like” or “looks like” is associated with deception. Deceivers are 
constantly paranoid that their version of events will not be accepted so they will typically 
include ways receivers can relate to, to reinforce their argument. However, there is also a 
widely held support for the view that lies, in comparison to truths, are less forthcoming and 
less detailed as if the teller is trying to hold back giving too much information (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Hancock et al., 2005; Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2007; Hancock, 
Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; 
Newman et al., 2003). By providing fewer details, the deceiver is less likely to be exposed to 
debate and questions which if answered inadequately, will lead to suspicion (Hancock et al., 
2005).   
                                                 
11
 When one is doing things in contrast to what one believes in. 
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4. Deceivers usually have a hard time keeping track of the version of reality they have chosen 
to portray. On top of balancing the credibility of their story they will generally try to reduce 
the risk of self-contradiction and will be less likely to use exclusive words (such as “except” 
and “however”) or causation words (“because” or “for that reason” to name a few) (Hancock 
et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004).  
5. Deceivers generally exhibit cautious and sometimes even “nervous” behaviours (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2010 p. 2) as they try to authenticate their lies. As discussed above, they are careful 
in their word usage so as not to create any unnecessary loopholes or restrictions in their 
version of events. They are also noted as being very careful in the tone of their writing. 
Carlson et al. (2004), Larcker and Tayan (2010) and Larcker and Zakolyukina (2011) all 
assert that responses from deceivers are usually vague and indirect, as if speaking in 
generalities will prevent them from committing to anything that may contradict their version 
of events. They are also more evasive than non-deceivers, which may be a function of their 
fear of being caught out (DePaulo et al., 2003). Zhou et al. (2004) describe this approach as 
“relevance manipulation” (p. 86). In general, deceivers are perceived to be uncertain in their 
writing.  
However, deception detection in communication literature is typically focused on the physiological 
effects of deception (i.e. the physical changes in the human body). For that reason, the above papers 
used interviews and laboratory experiments to test their research questions. The narrative portions 
analysed were of the transcripts of the interviews only. These disclosures are different to written 
corporate disclosures by nature. Larcker and Tayan (2010) point out that verbal disclosures are 
generally formal, but unrehearsed. Deceivers are therefore more likely to let slip their deceptive 
intentions. On the other hand, written disclosures and in particular registered prospectuses are 
generally carefully crafted products of different parties, each specialising in an area (Deumes, 2008). 
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Any item that may arouse suspicion included in such disclosures is more likely to be identified and 
removed or rephrased. The intended audience of verbal and written narratives may also differ. 
Communication that has been tested in prior literature (i.e. interviews and conference calls) 
typically focus on one, or a small group of individuals. On the other hand, corporate disclosures 
such as prospectuses are distributed to a much larger audience: both existing and prospective 
investors. Marett and George (2004) look at the difference between deceiving one or multiple 
parties, and conclude that different ‘tactics’ are needed to deceive multiple parties. Herein lies 
another research gap: deception in communication to a large number of individuals. Despite this, 
Hobson et al. (2011) conclude that speech analysis is a good means of testing for fraud and that 
nonverbal cues should not be ruled out as they are good complements to verbal cues. Craig et al. 
(2012) suggest that an analysis of patterns of words used by CEOs over time is an important 
indication of deceptive behaviour. Therefore, the findings from previous literature could still be 
considered relevant. 
3.3 Non-bank deposit takers – finance companies 
The next sections provide a brief background of the financial sector in New Zealand. They cover 
the primary causes and consequences of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that are commonly cited 
in the literature.  This is followed by an analysis of the disclosure regulation of the finance sector in 
New Zealand before and after the GFC. The section concludes by looking at a specific form of 
disclosure relevant to finance companies: the registered prospectus. Finance companies have 
historically fallen short in their responsibilities in providing full disclosure of their risk profile. This 
is particularly evident when compared with other ‘like’ entities in the sector, such as registered 
banks (Deloitte, 2004). Although the Securities Commission did raise some concern over occasional 
substandard disclosure practices back in 2004 (Securities Commission, 2005), the extent of the 
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malpractice is only beginning to be uncovered by the receivers of some of the larger failed finance 
companies. In the receivers report for Lombard Finance, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) raised 
concerns over specific transactions that the company and its related entities were engaged in, and 
their financial reporting practices (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2008). PwC also reported that it had 
discovered several transactions that “warrant further investigation” during the receivership of 
Strategic Finance (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2011). 
Understanding the nature of the market may help understanding the rationale behind certain 
disclosure strategies of finance companies. Looking back, there has been some scepticism 
concerning the effectiveness of the disclosure regime, not only by the Securities Commission, but 
by New Zealand academics also12. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) acknowledges that 
the “current RBNZ model may be inadequate in a crisis situation” (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
n.d.b). Hess and Feng (2007) provide support, highlighting that the regulation of non-banks was 
“less stringent” than that of registered banks, and that there is growing concern about the adequacy 
of the risk management practices of some New Zealand finance companies.  
3.3.1 Background of the finance sector in New Zealand  
A combination of strong economic growth and overall investor confidence fostered a fertile 
environment for the finance sector prior to the GFC in New Zealand. Low interest rates also helped 
foster economic activity as it was less costly for firms to borrow (Economic Intelligence, 2006) and 
it helped stimulate the development of alternative sources of short term credit – finance companies 
(Guender, 1998). Unlike their registered counterparts, non-bank entities were not bound to the same 
extent of specific disclosure requirements nor were they supervised by the RBNZ (Hess & Feng, 
2007). Despite existing securities and reporting legislation such as the Financial Reporting Act 1993 
                                                 
12
 In Dunstan, Gallery, and Truong (2008) it was found that found “the NZX’s enforcement mechanisms were 
considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, uncertain, and broad, and the rules were 
inconsistent with international standards” (p.3) 
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applicable to ‘issuers13’ prior to the introduction of the new regulatory framework, there were no 
specific guidelines targeting NBDTs (Hess & Feng, 2007). These, along with other factors such as 
low barriers to entry (Economic Intelligence, 2007), enticed finance companies to enter the market. 
In September 2007, the RBNZ reported there were 103 non-bank institutions in New Zealand, 
which was a relatively large number considering New Zealand’s small population (KPMG, 2007). 
This was quite a significant presence, as the finance sector as a whole, inclusive of banking and 
non-banking institutions, accounted for 6.4% of the GDP in 2006 (Economic Intelligence, 2007).  
Rapid and irresponsible lending particularly by NBDTs in New Zealand (Simpson, Kern, and 
McGuigan, 2011), fuelled by rising house prices (Chiang & Prescott, 2010), created a boom in the 
housing market, which came to a halt by the end of 2007 (Emigratenz, 2007) with the advent of the 
GFC. As house prices plummeted, mortgage bearers started to default on their repayments. 
However the value of their houses could no longer cover the value of their mortgages, so reselling 
the house to cover mortgage repayments was no longer a viable option (Poole, 2010). As a result, a 
global credit crunch or a “misallocation of resources” occurred (Johnson & Neave, 2007). In simple 
terms, when applicants default on their loans, an opportunity cost arises. The supply of credit 
becomes restricted, and the cost of finance increases overall in the sector (Campello, Graham, & 
Harvey, 2010; Johnson & Neave, 2007). The effects are very pervasive, and have been felt globally. 
Such “weak governance and poor management” made the sector vulnerable to the changes in the 
external environment (Uganda, 2010). Bridgman, a corporate restructuring partner in PwC, argues 
that the GFC was only the tipping point, and that the real cause was the quality of the foundations 
and models the sector was built on (as cited in Uganda, 2010). The view that inadequate risk 
management practices, and not the wider economic environment, are the primary culprit of the 
crisis is echoed by analysts from other key institutions in the sector (Deloitte, 2011). Fear-induced 
                                                 
13
 As defined in section 4 of the Financial Reporting Act (1993) as “every person who has…allotted securities pursuant 
to an offer…”. These will include companies with public shareholders, and finance companies. 
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terminations of investment created a heavy outflow of credit, with most investors opting to deposit 
with registered banks instead.  This created a huge strain on the already precarious supply of funds 
(KPMG, 2007).  
By the end of 2006, the sector experienced a 6.9% drop in assets, which is significant considering 
the sector had experienced double-digit growth since 1999 (KPMG, 2006). The decreasing 
confidence in the overall sector added further instability to an already unstable sector. With 
registered banks reluctant at best to provide assistance, finance companies found it exceedingly 
difficult to diversify their funding options. To make matters worse for NBDTs, fierce competition 
arose from registered banks which were in a position to give away large interest margins (Economic 
Intelligence, 2007). This suggests that the low interest levels maintained by the RBNZ had been 
somewhat artificial (KPMG, 2008).  Business NZ, the leading advocacy group for enterprises in 
New Zealand (BusinessNZ, 2011) supports this claim. It argues that the New Zealand Government 
and the RBNZ caused the predicament by intervening with the workings of the market in providing 
access to ‘too easy credit’ and mortgages without sufficient asset backing (BusinessNZ, 2008). 
Despite the increasingly rapid growth in the sector, it was noted that there was a lack of 
differentiation in sources of funding, and, due to the favourable conditions, a heavy reliance on debt 
funding (KPMG, 2007). It also became apparent that the build-up of debt from a decade of lax 
credit terms and low interest rates helped feed consumers’ unsustainable spending habits, which 
were mostly funded by debt (KPMG, 2008). By the end of 2008, 33 institutions had ceased trading, 
putting $6,406.4 million of deposits at risk (JDJL Limited, 2011b). To date, a total of 63 NBDTs 
have been forced into moratorium, placed in receivership, or liquidated (JDJL Limited, 2011b).  
This makes it “the most fundamental dislocation in financial markets in our lifetimes” (New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2011). It is retrospectively clear that certain warning 
bells were ringing from 2002. 
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3.3.2 New Zealand’s response to the collapse 
Disclosures by finance companies appeared to have fallen short of regulatory requirements and 
investors’ expectations. Prudent self-proclaimed ‘sophisticated’ investors could no longer decipher 
information provided by finance companies to assess risks (Macfie, 2010). This meant that 
investors were taken by surprise when high-flying finance companies, which hitherto appeared to be 
thriving, collapsed under the harsh new economic conditions. A few of the failed finance companies 
have been summoned by the judicial system, to face claims that untrue statements had been made in 
their investment documents. These companies include Five Star Consumer Finance and the related 
group Five Star Finance, Nathans Finance, Bridgecorp and Bridgecorp Investments, and National 
Finance, to name a few (Financial Markets Authority, 2011a). Almost all the cases related to 
inadequate and at times, untrue disclosures regarding related-party transactions, types of business 
activities and standards applied by the firms. These items are basic information that should have 
been contained in the registered prospectuses, as per the Securities Act 1978. The directors of these 
companies had also inappropriately signed off the relevant investment statements and prospectuses, 
claiming that the financial position of their firms had not “materially and adversely changed” 
(Financial Markets Authority, 2011a). 
3.3.3 Regulation of the non-banking sector 
Back as early as September 2004, the Securities Commission of New Zealand grew wary of the 
practices of some finance companies in New Zealand. The KPMG Financial Institutions 
Performance Survey (FIPS) also gave notice of the potential credit risks from the lack of any 
specific mechanism for investors to assess the risk of their investments, in comparison with those of 
other possible investment vehicles. The Survey also noted that regulation was ineffective in making 
the finance companies disclose their risks (KPMG, 2007). In a discussion paper regarding the 
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finance companies’ disclosures, the Securities Commission reviewed the disclosure documents of 
thirty finance companies. It noted its disappointment in finding inconsistent levels of quality in 
disclosure documents and in some cases, that the minimum standards of regulations such as the 
Securities Act 1978 and Securities Regulations 1983 were not met (Securities Commission, 2005). 
Both Acts deal with misleading statements in a very general way. Section 34(1) of the Securities 
Act 1978 provides some detail about deceptive disclosures and requires the prohibition of 
distribution of a prospectus if “it is false or misleading in a material particular by reason of failing 
to refer, or give proper emphasis, to adverse circumstances”14. Overall, the Commission, in its 2004 
document, stated it was appalled by some of the disclosures being made by the finance sector. The 
Commission was of the view that, based on existing disclosure levels and quality, few 
‘unsophisticated’ investors would be able to gain a full understanding of the risks; and that the 
disclosures provided had the “potential to mislead investors” (Securities Commission, 2004 p.6).  
Since the GFC, numerous measures have been taken to improve the disclosure of NBDTs. 
Regulation specifically designed for non-banks was imposed for the first time in September 2007 
when the RBNZ required all deposit takers to comply with prudential requirements under a new 
regulatory framework. This decision followed a string of collapses in the finance sector (Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, 2007). It was the view of the RBNZ that investors’ confidence and 
participation in the troubled sector would take off again, if good quality information became 
available (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2011b). In summary, key changes have been made to 
capital adequacy ratios, related party disclosure, minimum liquidity requirements, mandatory credit 
ratings and risk management and governance programmes (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, n.d.b). 
                                                 
14
 Section 34(1) of the Securities Act 1978 in its entirety reads: No registered prospectus shall be distributed by or on 
behalf of an issuer, 
(a) after it has been amended unless all the amendments have been incorporated in, or attached by way of 
an instrument to, every copy of the registered prospectus that is so distributed; or 
(b) if it is false or misleading in a material particular by reason of failing to refer, or give proper emphasis, 
to adverse circumstances (whether or not it became so misleading as a result of a change in 
circumstances occurring after the date of the prospectus)  
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As part of the prudential disclosure regime, the Ministry of Economic Development and the RBNZ 
have enforced additional policies such as the standardising of disclosures and a regular six-month 
update requirement (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, n.d.a). However, there is no current obligation 
to notify investors of changes in the disclosure documents. The requirement for continuous updates 
is invaluable, as at present, prospectuses could be valid for eighteen months, so long as it is not 
‘misleading’ (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2011a). The new Financial Markets Authority (FMA), 
established under the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011, will also help provide some oversight 
in the sector. The FMA supersedes the Securities Commission, and takes over some responsibility 
from the Ministry of Economic Development. Its primary role entails enforcing all relevant 
legislation applicable to financial services and the securities market, to help ensure efficiency in the 
financial markets (Financial Markets Authority, 2011b). However, the FMA has made it very clear 
that it cannot eliminate all risks of investment. This remains the responsibility of the individual 
investor (Financial Markets Authority, 2011b). This highlights the importance investors and the 
general public place on the reliability of documents published by finance companies.  
In light of the rapidly diminishing confidence in the finance sector and a genuine fear that banks 
and other institutions would collapse (KPMG, 2008), two Deposit Guarantee schemes have been 
introduced by the New Zealand Government15 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2007). In simple 
terms, the Government is essentially acting as backing for the value of investment repayable at 
maturity within the scheme, provided the entity meets capital requirements. By 31st March 2009, 28 
NBDT were approved (KPMG, 2008). Although it was originally intended to be a temporary 
measure, the scheme was extended for qualifying entities until 31st December 2011 (The Treasury, 
2011). The effectiveness of such scheme was quickly evident. Without the guarantee, finance 
companies would have found it difficult to quell the anxiety rippling through investors, many of 
                                                 
15
 The retail deposit guarantee scheme was rolled out on 12th October 2008 and the wholesale deposit guarantee scheme 
on the 14th of November 2008.   
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whom quickly transferred their funds to qualifying NBTDs as non-qualifying debt investments 
could not be guaranteed elsewhere at reasonable prices (KPMG, 2008). The Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme has already been a life saver for some investors. However, some were not so lucky. 
Investors of South Canterbury Finance, who qualified under the scheme, managed to get their entire 
invested capital back from the receivers, which amounted to $1.8 billion in total (The Treasury, 
2010), while those who invested in the failed finance company, Provincial Finance, will only 
receive 10 to 20 cents of their original investment (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2006). 
The efficacy of the guarantees is under heavy debate. In 2008 when the Government introduced the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme, only a handful of finance companies could meet the criteria (Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, 2011a), sparking a dramatic relocation of funds into the selected companies 
and registered banks. However, KPMG notes that such move did not provide significant assurance. 
For investors of registered banks, it was a sigh of relief that was not sorely needed, as registered 
banks already have the support of the RBNZ under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989.16 
For investors in finance companies that did not qualify on the other hand, it was the catalyst for 
mass movement in the market, and the depletion of what little confidence the market had in 
struggling finance companies. Regardless, it is now clear that the lack of rigorous regulation 
allowed too many finance companies which did not have enough resources as a buffer to continue 
trading, at the expense of the investors who invested funds in them (KPMG, 2007). 
There are relatively few studies dedicated specifically to examining finance companies. Indeed, 
some even exclude such companies. For instance Purda and Skillicorn (2012) and Beneish (1997) 
both excluded such companies from their sample. Cole and Jones (2005) argue that such move is 
generally due to the unique characteristic such as specific regulations on disclosures, and risks that 
                                                 
16
 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 allows the RBNZ to minimise the potential damage of a failing bank by 
its crisis management powers. 
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often compromises the comparability of such disclosures. This represents a significant research gap, 
particularly in light of the reliance finance companies have on their good image, which serves as an 
additional potential motivator to employ deceptive narratives. 
3.4 Different types of disclosures 
There are a lot of ways in which companies can communicate to their stakeholders and in particular, 
investors in the market. Typically these forms of communication include investor relations letters 
and annual reports. However, each type of disclosure allows varying levels of flexibility (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993) and varying relationships with the cost of capital (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). To 
complicate matters more, the same type of disclosures could have differing effects on investors’ 
perceptions, depending on the way it is presented and the sophistication of the investor (Hirshleifer 
& Teoh, 2003). Background knowledge is more essential than text coherence for investors in 
understanding CEO’s letters (Jameson, 2000). Less sophisticated investors may misinterpret or 
misunderstand relevant aspects of the disclosure (Lambert, 2003), and in particular, they may not be 
aware of the strategic incentive the firm might have to manipulate their perceptions (Hirshleifer & 
Teoh, 2003).  
Narrative disclosures communicate to investors information that can influence decision making, but 
which cannot be quantified in financial terms. As a result, this information is usually excluded from 
the financial statements (Tennyson et al., 1990). Although they are informative by nature, narrative 
disclosures are usually expressed in cautionary terms so as to act as “safe harbours” for the 
preparers (Henry, 2008). It is considered as “one of the most ubiquitous and powerful discourse 
forms in human communications” (Bruner (1990) as cited in Jameson, 2000) but prior literature 
furnishes no agreement on the usefulness of such reports. McConnell, Haslem, and Gibson (1986) 
consider them to be “carefully crafted public relations documents with little, if any, substantive 
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content.” Geppert and Lawrence (2008) point out that such disclosures are not regulated and are 
heavily influenced by management. Bettman and Weitz (1983), Clapham and Schwenk (1991), and 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) share similar findings, with Abrahamson and Park (1994) stating that 
the incidences of “impression management” they found suggest narrative disclosures are self-
serving rather than informative. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) point out that the dangers of 
impression management are severe. The authors assert that if users are susceptible to such practice 
then “adverse capital allocations may result” (p.116) which may disrupt the entire market. The 
authors argue that impression management implies a misalignment between the reality portrayed by 
the financial statements, and the reality described by management.  
On the other hand, other academics are much more positive about the use of narrative disclosures. 
Schipper (1991) argues they are of “great importance”, even for more sophisticated users such as 
analysts.  This view is shared by Yuthas et al., (2002) who advocate that such disclosures are 
relevant as “the most important information is forward looking. Old news is no news.” Smith and 
Taffler (1995) found that it was a complementary source of information to the traditional financial 
statements, and its absence in literature is possibly due to the difficulties of examination in an 
objective manner. In their later study of relationships between words and financial variables, Smith 
and Taffler (2000) found that narrative disclosures are important as a tool for reporting on a firm’s 
failure, suggesting that they contain not only vital information on the past, but also about the future. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) have similar findings, stating that qualitative risk disclosures tend to be 
more relevant than their quantitative counter parts. Academic enquiry is now reaching beyond the 
traditional financial perspective of insolvent and financial distressed firms.  
3.4.1 Financial statement fraud vs. deception in narratives   
In the wake of high-profile corporate collapses such as those of Enron and Worldcom, fraud in 
financial accounting has been well explored (Rezaee, 2005). However, most studies tend to focus 
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on ‘financial statement fraud17’. Johnson, Jamal and Grazioli (1993) briefly described the idea of 
deception in narratives as “mimicking” in their investigation of detection of fraud from an auditors’ 
perspective. Nevertheless the authors acknowledged that their use of narrative knowledge was 
“limited”.  Perhaps because the narrative sections of annual reports are not audited they tend to fall 
short of being topics worthy of professional and academic investigation. Deception and fraud in 
financial reporting is not a new phenomenon in our society. People are inherently poor at detecting 
lies due to their tendency to be biased towards expecting to get the truth (Carlson et al., 2004). 
There are even arguments that the dichotomy of fact and fiction is fast losing its relevance as 
corporate disclosures become more focused on narratives (Evans, 2009). However, there is limited 
research relating to deception in terms of accounting narratives, with most research pinpointing the 
more obvious forms of fraud in the accounting treatment (Baker, 2003; Gordon, 2002; Leach et al., 
2007; Scharff, 2005). Carlson et al., (2004) argues that this is largely attributed to the difficulties in 
detecting deception as there is no single indicative behaviour that can reliably define a person to be 
‘deceptive’.  
However, there are questions as to whether narrative disclosures can be taken at face value. Weber 
(1980) found financially distressed companies were more susceptible to overstate their future 
prospects to try and retain investor’s favour (as cited in Boo & Simnett, 2002). In Tennyson et al. 
(1990), the narrative disclosures of healthy firms were found to focus more on growth opportunities 
while financially weaker firms disclosed more on their external environment. Fisher (1994) argues 
that “rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings - their awareness of 
narrative coherence…whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be 
true in their lives” (p.10). This suggests that past experiences will interact with the texts from 
narrative disclosures, influencing the received meaning. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) posit that 
                                                 
17
 This includes but is not limited to the manipulation of accounting records, material intentional misstatements of 
events and transactions, misapplication of accounting standards, intentional omissions of accounting standards and other 
financial information, earnings management and aggressive accounting techniques and the manipulation of accounting 
practice (Rezaee, 2005). 
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market considerations should be measured, in that the market perceives that such disclosures are 
usually selectively disclosed. Selective disclosure is more likely where flexibility in disclosure is 
allowed (Boo & Simnett, 2002). Narrative disclosures are therefore subjective by nature as they are 
“a construction, rather than a reconstruction” (Jameson, 2000). Rutherford (2005) provides further 
support, stating that narrative disclosures are subjective, and communicated strategically in a 
relatively “mechanical manner” to obey regulatory codes. The flexibility of the regulation 
surrounding narrative reports have generally being seen by critics of such reports as the reason for 
such inconsistency and incomparability (Yuthas et al., 2002). Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) 
had come to the a similar conclusion. They found increasing opportunities for impression 
management within corporate reports and that the information content of such disclosures varied 
depending on the financial health of the company. Conaway and Wardrope (2010) are of the view 
that “words presented in corporate documents may not exist as objective reality but rather as an 
effort of ‘sense making’ by corporate writers who wish to construct support for organisational 
practices” (p. 142). The authors find no guidelines as to what should be or should not be included in 
CEO’s letters to investors and argue that such freedom makes narrative disclosures “strategic rather 
than informative”. This flexibility, as stated by Purda and Skillicorn (2012), allows the authors of 
such written media to  “aggressively”, and “legitimately” enhance their image. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy is the conclusion Smith (1995) made, which suggests that narrative disclosures may 
increase errors in decision making by adding confusion. The author suggested mandatory audits of 
narrative disclosures to reduce misleading messages conveyed by such disclosure. 
Narrative disclosures should have high academic importance because unsophisticated investors may 
place more reliance on the text portions of financial disclosure as they may not feel as confident in 
deciphering the numeric information. Frost (1997) asserts that the market is capable of discounting 
positive management prospective statements made by companies experiencing financial difficulties. 
On this basis there is scope in academic research for narrative discloser analysis (Henry, 2008). The 
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most common form of disclosure is through the annual reports distributed to the investors and the 
impacts of such disclosures are well documented in prior literature.18 This is even more so in 
relation to financial distress.19 However, relatively little attention has been given to other forms of 
disclosures. The next section intends to summarise the most relevant type of disclosure for a NBDT: 
the registered prospectus. 
3.4.2 NBDT specific disclosure documents: the registered prospectus 
Prospectuses are a special case of a document as it provides narrative that may be deceptive through 
biases in its wording. There are many users of corporate disclosure documents like the registered 
prospectuses and many conflicting objectives to achieve. Psychology literature (for example Caso et 
al., 2005; Hyman, 1989; Newman et al., 2003 to name a few) cites contradictory objectives to be a 
pulling factor of employing deceptive disclosure practices. In the case of a poorly performing 
company, there may be more pressure to fulfil market expectations, which may not be achievable, 
and hence the conflict. These conflicting purposes may collectively amount to an incentive for 
deceptive disclosure. Van Staden and Hooks (2007) assert that “previous studies involving content 
analysis…[have] usually only focused on Annual Report disclosures” (p. 198). However, few 
academics have questioned the dominance of such reports. Courtis (1986) (as cited in Jameson, 
2000) found these reports to be too difficult for average readers. Linsley and Slack (2010) argue 
that the lack of coherence and inadequate disclosures of risk policies are undoubtedly a fundamental 
limitation of annual reports.  Linsley and Slack (2010) suggest that alternative disclosures may also 
help overcome the underlying limitations of the Annual Reports. In light of these flaws, the 
registered prospectus seems to fill this gap, particularly with its emphasis on risk disclosures.  
                                                 
18
 See (Healy & Palepu, 2001), Firth, (1978) and Singhvi & Desai, (1971) 
19
 See Altman (1968) Altman and Saunders (1997) and Laitinen (1993)  
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The prospectus is designed to complement the investment statement, and provides information on 
all material matters, such as the risks relating to the investment (Deumes, 2008). As it is required by 
legislation, it is deemed to be the most important of corporate disclosures for a NBDT. The 
Securities Act 1978 and Securities Regulations 200920 both require issuers to provide registered 
prospectuses when offering securities. It is required to be dated, in written form and must be 
registered with the Companies’ Registrar (Securities Commission, 2005). A continuous updating 
requirement obliges a firm to update the prospectus and investment statement, if these no longer 
include all relevant information and become misleading (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2011a). 
Importance is thus also placed on the investment statement, which acts as the “principal point of 
sale document” (Securities Commission, 2005 p.5). The Securities Act 1978 states that the purpose 
of such a document is to provide material that can assist the decision making of “prudent but non-
expert” investors (s.38D) and alert them to the existence of other important documents which are 
presented in a question-and-answer format to aid simple understanding (Securities Commission, 
2004). However, KPMG (2007) finds that attempts by firms to comply with all necessary 
investment statement regulations have made it difficult for investors to read these documents as at 
times, they may be well over seventy pages in length.  
Deumes (2008) also discusses some potential shortfalls associated with prospectuses. The author 
first argues that as risks are entity and company specific, while regulations concerning such 
disclosures have generally been quite vague and open to interpretation. This has led some critics, 
including Schrand and Elliott (1998), to question the validity of the prospectus, on the basis of the 
information presented being sometimes too subjective. Schrand and Elliot note that the overall 
drawback to narrative, or qualitative disclosures is that they cannot achieve the same kind of 
credibility available to quantitative disclosures. “[Quantitative information] improves [the] 
                                                 
20
 Section 5 and Schedule 1of the Securities Regulations 2009 specifies the matters to be contained in full registered 
prospectuses. This includes, but is not limited to, the main terms of offer, name and address of offeror, details of 
incorporation of issuer, principal subsidiaries of issuer, names, addresses, and other information. 
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credibility of disclosures and makes them ex-post verifiable” (p. 280). Hodder, Koonce, and 
McAnally (2001) also question the value of narrative disclosures, arguing that it is hard for 
investors to translate qualitative information into quantitative information for risk assessment. 
Others also criticise on the one hand, the lack of comparability between different investments, and 
on the other, the “one size fits all” (Securities Commission, 2005) approach used by Schedule 3D of 
the Act.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales found prospectuses to contain more 
information than financial statements on the risks of investments (Deumes, 2008).  Fuller and 
Jensen (2002) also provide support for this argument, claiming that “trying to mask uncertainty that 
is inherent in every business is like pushing up a balloon: smoothing out today’s bumps means they 
will pop up somewhere else tomorrow, often with catastrophic results” (p. 43). Deumes (2008) 
further argues that thoroughly prepared prospectuses may also benefit the companies themselves as 
understanding the risks they are exposed to can prevent future damage to their reputation, which is 
essential in the finance sector. However, despite their importance, there appears to be little 
empirical evidence as to how informative these disclosures actually are (Deumes, 2008), and this is 
more so in New Zealand.  Further research in prospectuses and investment statements as disclosure 
documents should prove to be very beneficial. Perhaps registered prospectuses have greater 
significance than annual reports for ordinary companies in that the former, by enticing potential 
investors to invest, can directly secure the company’s short term financial funding requirements. 
Therefore, the effect of bad news in a prospectus may have more immediate results than similar bad 
news in an annual report for an ordinary company. This highlights a significant gap in the literature 
currently dominated by studies of annual reports. The narrative portions of prospectuses, that is, the 
communications from the chief executive, chairman or directors are important objects of research as 
good news and bad news are often communicated using those channels. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Poor disclosure is a particularly damaging phenomenon in the finance sector. Greater monitoring of 
companies going through financial difficulties is needed, particularly with NBDTs and the 
information they provide in their registered prospectuses which now appears questionable in 
hindsight. Considering the importance of, and reliance on directors’ or chairmen’s statements by 
users of company disclosures, deception in narratives is a significant research topic. However, a 
quick review of prior literature reveals many gaps and indeed, opportunities and scope for further 
investigation. Deception in narratives is an area that has been overshadowed by its financial and 
numerical counterparts, with most studies of fraud concentrating on accounting treatments and 
earnings management. Due to the relatively little attention given to firms in financial distress, prior 
literature is unclear on whether the same assumptions can hold for both distressed and viable firms. 
This is especially the case for finance institutions that are inherently more vulnerable to risks and 
changes in the market, and the specialised disclosures that they make. Their specialised disclosure 
and the nature of their business really puts into question the applicability of past findings. Another 
point of interest that is scarcely covered by existing literature is the impact of deception on 
communication with more than one intended recipient. When a deceiver is attempting to deceive 
multiple parties, as is the case of directors responsible for misleading corporate disclosure 
documents, a different approach may need to be taken in comparison to a single party. More 
research in this area would definitely be of value.  
These are significant research gaps, and this paper seeks to address them. Text analysis can be a 
good means of testing for deception in narratives. This supports the approach used in this thesis of 
examining the frequencies of identified ‘lying words’. Through the use of content analysis, this 
study seeks to fill in the little pockets of uncertainty within the existing literature. 
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4. Research question and hypothesis formulation     
The following section will describe the six hypotheses examined in the current study. Deception in 
narrative disclosures is an area that has been examined, yet no conclusive indicators of deception 
have been found. However, sometimes disclosure of true and unfavourable news may be “suicidal” 
(Jorgenson, 2004 p.1), which prompts companies to think twice about their disclosure, and some 
may even go to extreme lengths such as omitting (Boo & Simnett, 2002; Van De Wiele, 2002), or 
even distorting the disclosures (Rezaee, 2005). Ultimately, these incentives cause deception, or 
elements of deception, to be seemingly “inevitable” when a company is under financial distress 
(Myers, 1977 p. 159) . Consistent with the forgoing discussion, it is hypothesised that companies, 
especially finance companies which are financially distressed, are more prone to make more 
‘deceptive’ disclosures. In light of this, this study proposes the following six hypotheses, all 
expressed in the alternative form. All hypotheses are expressed in alternative form, and are 
measurable at the 5% level of a Type I error21.  
H1A: The deception score of narrative disclosures by failed companies is significantly 
higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Overall, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) posit that future research incorporating both scenarios 
(i.e. impression management and incremental information) will provide valuable information. 
Larcker and Tayan (2010) are stalwart advocates of the idea that the language composition of 
narratives can provide an indication as to whether they are true or false. The authors assert that 
subtle changes in the usage of certain words can convey deep psychological effects of deceit. 
However, Carlson, George, Burgoon, Adkins, and White (2004) also acknowledge that this is an 
area that has been largely ignored by academics. 
                                                 
21
 Type I error is the risk that the null hypothesis is rejected, when it should have been accepted. At the 5% confidence 
level, there is greater risk of a type I risk as opposed to a type II risk (confirming a null hypothesis when it should have 
been rejected) (Black et al., 2007). 
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H2A: The use of personal association words in narrative disclosures by failed companies is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Bournois and Point (2006)  found three tactical uses of the word “I”:  first to place the authors as a 
representative of the social group; second to express personal commitments made; and third to 
project themselves as a principal motivating force of a project. Fear of association plays a big part 
in the mind of the communicator, especially when addressing investors who are concerned about 
the future of the company. The use of personal pronouns such as “I” and “my” were therefore found 
to be substantially reduced in deceptive disclosures as the communicator did not want any 
responsibility over the news they were portraying (Hancock et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila 
& Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2011; Newman et al., 2003; 
Zhou et al., 2004). They also did not want their reputations to be tainted. Tennyson et al., (1990) 
found evidence that financially weaker firms disclosed more about their external environment, 
rather than internal processes. 
H3A: The use of negative emotive words in narrative disclosures by failed companies is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
The choice of deception affects the inner psyche of everyone to some extent and in most cases the 
effect is indirect. One possible manifestation of deception on one’s psyche is the words choice of 
deceivers. Deceivers were found to use more negative emotive words from the mental discomfort 
caused by betraying their conscience (Hancock et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & 
Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2011; Newman et al., 2003; 
Zhou et al., 2004). Caso et al. (2005) argues that above all, deceivers will be nervous, and (Inbau, 
Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2011) also points out that they will be more uncomfortable than truth 
tellers. Hobson et al. (2011) found that executives who are suffering from “cognitive dissonance” 
will be more prone to conveying negative news about their firm’s  future performance. However, 
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some authors found contradictory results. Larcker and Tayan (2010) posit that deceivers will tend to 
over-exaggerate positive news and discount negative news, thus suggesting lower use of negative 
words. 
H4A: The use of sensory descriptive words in narrative disclosures by failed companies is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
In order to substantiate their version of events, deceivers tend to be more expressive with their 
descriptions. The excessive use of sensory descriptive words, such as “feels like”, “sounds like” or 
“looks like” is associated with deception (Hancock et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & 
Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004). Deceivers are 
constantly paranoid that their version of events will not be accepted so they will typically include 
ways receivers can relate to, to reinforce their argument. Marett and George (2004) posit that it is 
‘easier’ to deceive a group by creating a familiar feeling. The authors found this to help enhance the 
deceiver’s supposed credibility.  
H5A:  The use of exclusive words in narrative disclosures by failed companies is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Related to the point above, deceivers usually have a hard time keeping track of the version of reality 
they have chosen to portray. On top of balancing the believability of their story they will generally 
try to reduce the risk of self-contradiction and will be less likely to use exclusive words (such as 
“except” and “however”) or causation words (“because” or “for that reason” to name a few) 
(Hancock et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 
2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004). 
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H6A:  The degree of certainty in narrative disclosures by distressed companies is 
significantly less than that of disclosures by non-distressed companies.  
The tone of words is also an important consideration for deceivers, and therefore deception 
detection. As deceivers are generally more cautious (Larcker & Tayan, 2010), they are careful in 
not only their word usage so as to not create any unnecessary loopholes or restrictions, but also in 
the tone of their writing. Carlson et al., (2004), Larcker and Tayan (2010) and Larcker and 
Zakolyukina (2011) assert that by speaking in generalities, this may prevent them from committing 
to anything that may contradict with their version of events, and hence draw suspicion to their 
deceptive activities. Deceivers are also said to be more evasive than non-deceivers, which may be 
from their fears of getting caught out (DePaulo et al., 2003). In general, deceivers are perceived to 
be uncertain in their writing.   
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5.  Research methodology & method        
This section will describe the research methodology and method used to test the six hypotheses 
identified in section four. The failed and non-failed samples will be discussed, followed by the 
dependent and independent variables (i.e. the deception score and components of the deception 
score) examined. Next, the method of content analysis is discussed in detail, followed by a deep 
look at the software, DICTION. 
5.1 Failed and non-failed firms  
The primary objective of this study is to look at disclosures of failed companies from the finance 
sector of New Zealand in a period leading up to their ultimate collapse. On a retrospective look, 
disclosures made by finance companies have been inadequate. From the judgments passed down by 
the courts, disclosures made by distressed companies have been incomplete, insufficient and at 
times, outright misleading22. If failing finance companies are consistently exhibiting disclosure 
practices similar to those described as ‘deceptive’ in general deception literature, or are disclosing 
in a manner significantly different to the control companies in this thesis, the control sample 
methodology should be able to pick that out. These warnings may be able to buy investors more 
time to re-think their investment. The literature discussed in the previous two chapters tends to 
suggest that failing companies have more motivation to provide deceptive disclosures.  
A sample of failed finance companies was compared against a control sample, and the differences 
examined in the study. In determining the failed and control samples, the current study took the 
approach that ‘failed’ and ‘non-failed’ were mutually exclusive classifications. As such, if a finance 
company was not deemed ‘failed’, then they are more appropriately classified as ‘non-failed’. As 
                                                 
22
 In cases such as Five Star Consumer Finance, Nathans Finance and Bridgecorp, the directors were found to have 
“made further untrue statements when they signed a prospectus extension certificates” (Financial Markets Authority, 
2011a). 
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discussed in Anderson and Chang (2011), there is a difference between ‘financially distressed’ 
companies and those in ‘bona fide financial distress’. Inclusion of companies which are only 
experiencing “momentary turbulence in trading” (p. 40) can distort a study’s findings as they are 
not in real financial difficulty. The Deep Freeze List on the interest.co.nz website records a list of 
finance companies that have failed as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. At the end of 2011, 
The Deep Freeze List shows that there were 63 public issuer finance companies23 in moratorium, 
liquidation or receivership – essentially these finance companies were in bona fide financial distress 
(JDJL Limited, 2011b). In contrast, a register was not kept detailing which finance companies are 
still actively trading. As a result, the full membership of the Financial Services Federation24 (FSF) 
was used to identify the number of non-failed public issuer finance companies in the New Zealand 
market. This yielded 33 active finance companies in total. However, of the 33 non-failed finance 
companies, only 24 companies provided a narrative component in their registered prospectuses. All 
the companies on the FSF membership site were cross-checked against the Deep Freeze List to 
ensure that none of the companies are recorded in both the failed and non-failed samples. 
The use of matched samples is said to allow for a more systematic analysis of potential relationships 
between financial narratives and performance (Smith & Taffler, 1992). However, it is problematic 
to devise a control sample that matches and compares individual deception scores of companies in 
both samples due to potential bias that may be introduced in the process. Failed and non-failed 
samples used in the study were not artificially matched against each other using arbitrary criteria25. 
Zmijewski (1984) cites several arguments against the use of matched samples, with the distortion of 
reality being one of the primary reasons. In particular, the author questions whether the use of 
choice-based samples (i.e. a matched sample with equal proportion) is appropriate. The author 
argues that the proportion of failed to non-failed firms is unlikely to be even (i.e. a 50/50 matched 
                                                 
23
 However, not all of the 63 companies provided the necessary information to be included in the study. 
24
 The major New Zealand grouping of non-bank financial institutions (Financial Service Federation, 2011a). 
25
 For example, in Frino et al. (2007) individual failed and non-failed companies were matched based on market 
capitalisation and total revenue in the same sample period.  
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sample), but the failed proportion of failed firms is usually significantly lower26. Haber (2008) 
argues that the equal control sample assumption is one of the fundamental flaws of matched 
samples, as the success rate is dependent on how well the proportions reflect reality. Sampling bias 
may also be introduced as not all items in the population will have an equal chance of being 
included, in an effort to maintain the equal proportions.  
The current study notes the criticisms of matched samples and adopts unmatched and unequal 
samples. New Zealand’s business environment was the reason for not using identical failed and 
non-failed sample sizes. As at October 2012 the membership of active finance companies and 
building societies contained 33 finance companies (Financial Service Federation, 2011b) and based 
on this, the market failure rate was 66%.27 The sample examines a total of 189 prospectuses28 in the 
relative timeline and 199 companies in the calendar timeline from 57 different finance companies, 
of which, 33 have become bona fide failed finance companies i.e. those which have been liquidated, 
or are in receivership or are subject to a moratorium. These two time frames are further explained 
later in the chapter. One hundred and twenty-seven from the relative timeline were from the failed 
sample. The remainder 62 were from the control sample. The sample rate of failure based on the 
distribution of prospectuses is 67%. Alternatively, looking at the actual finance companies, the 
sample failure rate is 58%. In terms of the calendar timeline, 127 prospectuses from failed finance 
companies were examined, in comparison to 72 prospectuses from the control sample. The sample 
rate of failure for the calendar timeline based on the distribution of prospectuses is 64%. Overall, 
the sample is designed to better reflect the actual proportion of failed to non-failed firms rather than 
to obtain a sample consisting of equal proportions of failed and non-failed firms. 
                                                 
26
 Historically, the frequency of financial failure has not exceeded 0.75% since 1984 (Zmijewski, 1984) 
27
 The suggested population of finance companies in New Zealand as at October 2012 is 96. This is made up of 63 
failed finance companies as shown in the Deep Freeze List, and 33 active finance companies. 
28
 The dates of the prospectuses span from 2002 to 2010. 
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Altman (1968), who examined 33 bankrupt companies and 33 similar non-bankrupt companies, had 
developed a bankruptcy prediction model, the ‘Z Score’. He examined whether his model could 
correctly classify the 66 failed and not failed companies. Frino et al. (2007) also examined 78 failed 
and 78 non-failed firms in terms of cumulative abnormal returns from bankruptcy announcements. 
Although both studies used matched samples, their results were not the relative results of the 
individual matched pairs, but of the two samples separately. That was also approach used by the 
current study. The decision not to pair up each prospectus in the distress sample to a corresponding 
control company prospectus was to reduce potential bias that may be introduced in the process. 
Potential bias could arise from determining which relevant characteristic ought to be used in 
matching failed with non-failed companies, i.e., there are many characteristics that could be used, 
such as size, portfolio structure, risk appetite, etc. and choosing any one in particular is essentially 
aribitrary (Zmijewski, 1984). For instance, the differing risk appetites of finance companies 
complicate the matching process, as these risks will affect how prospectuses are constructed, and 
may create noise and ‘statistical differences’ irrelevant to the study. The small sample size renders 
closely matched samples inappropriate, as the accuracy may be compromised (Smith & Liou, 2007). 
Overall, this study intends to examine the effects of time on deception and non-deception cues in 
written media. Such approach of having a time series of both failed and non-failed firms increases 
the probabilty of an observation being deceptive in the whole population of firms (Purda & 
Skillicorn, 2012). This is said to be a good attribute to have in deception detection techniques. 
Pruda and Skillicorn (2012) suggest it can capture changes in language, regulation, or any corporate 
events  and the effects they have on the coporate disclsures. 
In comparison with international studies, the sample of 33 failed and 24 control firms (57 in total) 
may seem small, however this reflects New Zealand’s small market size. A large sample size, as 
typically found in US studies is simply unachievable for such a small nation. Interestingly, however, 
Altman (1968) maintained validity and credibility with a small matched US company sample size of 
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33 (66 in total). This is one of the most cited papers in the field of financial distress. Other papers 
within the financial distress literature such as Smith and Taffler (2000), Luoma and Laitinen (1991) 
and John, Lang, and Netter (1992) also have matched sample sizes of less than 50. By focusing on 
the finance sector, this study eliminates noise arising from differing industries and sectors. As the 
finance sector may not be comparable to other sectors, and usually operates under different 
assumptions, the use of data from other industries for the sake of increasing the sample size was 
rejected. The definition of financial distress used in the study has also helped restrict the potential 
sample size. The failed sample includes only finance companies that are in bona fide financial 
distress. This restriction is considered necessary, as those are the companies which have had the 
risks of defaulting on principal repayments to investors converted into an actual default. As 
discussed previously, Anderson and Chang (2011) found that profit warnings and suspensions of 
trade were inadequate predictors of financial distress among the NZX-listed firms as they were too 
“noisy”. Such a vague classification of ‘financial distress’ has the potential to include companies 
that are not in any real danger but just experiencing temporary turbulence in the normal course of 
trading. Other papers have adopted similar approaches and restricted their classifications. Frino et al 
(2007), who conduct an events study to look at the impact of bankruptcy announcements in 
Australia, use the legal definition of financial distress and include only companies in receivership 
and liquidation. Similarly, Altman (1968) used only bankrupt firms in his study.  
In the finance sector in New Zealand, there is a distinction between registered banks and NBDTs 
such as finance companies, building societies and credit unions. In line with the identified gap in the 
literature, the current paper examines NBDT, and specifically finance companies. It is also 
important to recognise the distinction between two types of finance companies in New Zealand, 
public issuers and private deposit takers. As mentioned above, issuers in the public domain are 
subject to legislation and regulation relevant to the issuance or offering of securities. Consequently, 
public corporate disclosure documents such as financial statements, registered prospectuses and 
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investment statements are readily available through the Companies Register. The second and 
increasingly prominent type of finance company is privately funded, and hence there is no 
publically available information listed with the Registrar. In keeping with the work of Hess and 
Feng (2007), the former type will be examined in the study, as they represent the type of NBDT that 
the general public will have access to. Attempts have been made to obtain data from the second type 
of NBDT, but the required financial information has not been made available to the researcher. 
5.2. Relative and Calendar Timelines  
In order to examine the whether the writing style of failed companies changes relative to the distress 
level, this study looks at two samples frames: the relative timeline and the calendar timeline. The 
next sections will explain in detail how this study arrives at each of the samples. 
Figure 1: Distribution of prospectuses – relative timeline 
 
The ‘relative failed sample’ contains a mixture of prospectuses preceding the year of their 
company’s collapse. Figure 1 shows the distribution of prospectuses in the ‘relative’ study. 
Interestingly, there were significantly fewer prospectuses for the failed sample in the earlier years 
prior to the collapse. The main difference in the lack of information was due to more of the failed 
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finance compaines being smaller and younger. Indeed, the majority of the surviving companies in 
the control sample were more stable and well known, and had more capital to rely on during the 
Global Financial Crisis. All the prospectuses in the failed sample were sorted based on their years 
until receivership, liquidation or moratorium (year of collapse). These dates range from 2002 to 
2010. As discussed above, the most problematic aspect of the study was finding a way to devise a 
control sample to compare with the results of the failed finance companies. The control companies 
were not matched to individual failed companies based on any one common characteristic as noted 
earlier, but were sorted in ascending order, with ‘the year of collapse’ (year 0) mapped to 2010 as it 
was the latest year with available data, as 2011 yielded no useable data for the failed sample. This 
allowed the distribution of the prospectuses to be similar to that of the failed sample to allow more 
meaningful results. The remaining years were mapped accordingly. In effect, there are two versions 
of the analysis: the failed sample in the relative timeline against the non-failed sample in the 
calendar timeline, and the failed sample in the calendar timline against the non failed sample of the 
same sample time frame. This approach is appropriate as the non-failed (i.e. control sample) are 
companies that did not fail, and therefore will not have been able to contain data for years prior to 
their ‘collapse’. In order to maintain the desired failed:control ratio as described in the above 
section, only the period between 6 years before collapse (-6) and the year of collapse (0) will be 
examined.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of prospectuses – calendar timeline 
 
With changes in time come subtle changes in the language style used in printed media (Can & 
Patton, 2004). Such subtle changes may distort the scores calculated by DICTION in the study, thus 
the ‘calendar timeline’ sample was created. Smith and Liou (2007) assert that the changing 
economic trends and cycle cause instability in the data over time. The calendar timeline compares 
prospectuses within the same time period, isolating the effect of changes in language style. Both 
sets of prospectuses examined will also be subject to the same market conditions, so the study can 
examine whether failed and control finance companies respond differently to the same economic 
crisis. The calendar timeline shows that most of the prospectuses were from between 2003 and 2007, 
peaking at 24 in 2004 for failed companies and 9 for control companies. During this time the New 
Zealand economy was a fertile breeding ground for investment activity and created an abundance of 
finance companies (Economic Intelligence, 2008), with a lot of usable data for the study. From 
2004 onwards the frequency of prospectuses for the failed sample steadily decreased as more 
troublesome finance companies were thrown into the spotlight and forced to exit the market. The 
control sample size remained relatively constant.  
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5.3 Content analysis 
Beattie and Thomson (2007) state that “content analysis has become a widely used method of 
analysis in financial accounting research” (p. 129). The use of content analysis is a key tool for 
discovering differences, if any, in disclosure practices between failed and non-failed firms. Content 
analysis is an approach that categorises text and quantifies incidences of certain words or themes 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). Krippendorff (2004) argues it “is a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from text to the contexts of their use” (p.18). It has been extensively 
used to examine different types of corporate disclosures. Content analysis has been used in studies 
such as Tennyson et al, (1990), Smith and Taffler (2000), Kohut and Segars (1992), and Bowman 
(1984).  In Tennyson et al, (1990), it helped examine the relationship between financial and 
narrative disclosures and the effectiveness of these to explain bankruptcy. Content analysis is 
chosen as it, arguably, can systematically examine the disclosures of both the failed and non-failed 
firms, with a reasonable level of objectivity (Berelson, 1952; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999).  
Generally, there are two forms of content analysis. Form-oriented content analysis focuses on 
objective measures such as frequencies while meaning-oriented taps into the meaning of the subject 
(Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007). The authors argue that although the meaning-oriented approach is 
said to overcome the rigidity of the former approach, it effectively may not achieve its objective, as 
the researcher must make the inferences based on personal judgement. Comparability and reliability 
are therefore traded off. Readers may not come to the same conclusion as “[the information] is 
made, rather than discovered by the researcher” (Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007). Objectivity can be 
maintained through the consistent use of categories when examining the narrative disclosures of the 
sample of registered prospectuses. The current study adopts a form-oriented approach, as 
consistency and universal acceptance of the categories examined between readers is of high 
importance. Frequencies of words will be examined, allowing minimal opportunities for the 
author’s personal views to impact on the objects of interest. The study may be rendered useless if 
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readers do not accept the methods and assumptions used, and therefore the results produced. 
Although it would seem overly simplistic and lacking in human judgement, the form-oriented 
approach has been found to furnish similar results to complex and subjective methodologies (Smith 
& Taffler, 2000).  
There is also the question of whether to employ computer assisted techniques, or manually analyse 
the data. Deumes (2008) discusses some of the advantages/disadvantages of each approach. 
Although humans can better judge and adapt to the different meanings of words within different 
contexts, they are less cost effective and more susceptible to error and bias. Detection of traces of 
deception in general communication is complicated by nature, let alone in corporate disclosure 
documents. How could one, without the benefit of hindsight, unerringly determine if someone has 
the intention to mislead based on words on paper? Despite this, Burgoon and Nunamaker (2004) 
assert that, because of such high levels of complexity, human intervention is necessary in most 
cases.  However, the authors also admit that automated tools should be used to augment the 
researcher’s judgements. Hobson et al., (2011) have similar findings, stating that computerised 
algorithm programmes are better detectors of fraud than conventional methods. Generally there are 
three quantitative approaches to detecting deception: judgement based thematic content analysis, 
word pattern analysis and word count analysis (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). Wang 
and Wang (2012 p. 3393) support the use of word counts, citing it as a “reliable and transparent 
approach”. Of the papers examined, the majority adopted word count analysis and the software of 
choice has tended to be Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC).  The current study will adopt 
the word count analysis approach also, but DICTION will be used to assist the process. 
5.4 DICTION 
DICTION has been found to be an efficient and effective form of content analysis that is also 
consistent with human-oriented methods (Short & Palmer, 2008). It is widely used in the linguistic 
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literature, for example, in Pennebaker et al. (2003), and as such, its capabilities can be vouchsafed 
(Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). DICTION is not a newcomer to the field of financial distress. For 
example, Linsley and Slack (2010) examined press releases of Northern Rock with DICTION and 
how the language evolved as the company went through its crisis period. Frequency of certain 
words could become potential warning bells for traces of deception and impending finance distress. 
Using a ‘form-oriented’ approach, Smith and Taffler (2000) found evidence that one is able to 
predict corporate failure based on the existence of words such as “overdraft”, “disposal” and “no 
dividends”. Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2006) found that investors can be manipulated by 
management’s optimism in their earnings announcements, but will later change their opinions if 
they find that analysts have been sceptical. Overall, DICTION has been very useful in accounting 
research and more recently, financial distress. 
There are five major semantic components examined by DICTION: activity, optimism, certainty, 
realism and commonality, each defined by a series of subcomponent which are in defined by 
different words. Examining in units of 500 words, DICTION keeps track of the number of times a 
word that fits each of the five categories appear based on its 10,000 word dictionary29 and this 
produces a score. This score can signal the overall tone of the language of the document. A useful 
function of DICTION is the ability, on the part of the researcher, to tweak pre-set formulas 
(Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). For the purpose of the study, some subcategories of the five 
components did not describe any of the traits of deception, and therefore are irrelevant to the scope 
of this paper. As a result, the scores they produce will not be examined. Two additional categories 
have also been added in. The two user defined dictionaries have been created as none of the existing 
subcategories adequately defined the component of interest. 
                                                 
29
 For more information please refer to the DICTION 6.0 manual (Hart, 2000). 
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However, DICTION is not without its fair share of criticisms. Its handling of homographs, which 
are words with several unrelated meanings, is widely criticised (Short & Palmer, 2008). The authors 
argue that DICTION’s focus on word choice, and not the reasoning behind such choice, severely 
limits its ability to fill the gaps left by existing content analysis techniques. Because of this flaw, 
DICTION may be best used to examine predetermined categories, with set criteria that have 
empirical and theoretical backing. DICTION will be applied to examine common traits of deception 
documented in prior literature (i.e. use of personal pronouns, negative emotions etc.), so the effects 
of the second limitation may not come into play in this study. The words within the dictionaries of 
each trait of deception were closely scrutinised to ensure inappropriate or irrelevant words are 
excluded. The study into the reasoning of word choice is, in the researcher’s opinion, very 
subjective and cannot be achieved through frequencies of words alone. It would involve interviews 
with the persons involved, and is out of the scope of the current study. Short and Palmer (2008) 
consider DICTION to be unobtrusive, efficient and above all reliable. They advocate that its focus 
on the subtle powers underlying the choice of words and flexibility from custom dictionaries, 
particularly the dictionaries based on business materials, is definitely an advantage. The automated 
coding and quantification system helps strengthen validity (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). 
Another limitation with DICTION is the restriction to only single words in the user-defined 
dictionary. Compound words are broken up and listed into separate words. For example, the word 
“for that reason” is broken up and added as “for”, “that” and “reason”. The inclusion of such 
fragmented words has the potential to distort the study’s findings as the three words individually 
have a very different meaning to the term “for that reason”. This represents a significant setback for 
the analysis, as this severely limits the words of interest particularly in the ‘exclusion and causation’ 
dictionary. The way around this was to add each of these compound words as a ‘synthetic’ word 
without the spaces in between (e.g. “for that reason” becomes “forthatreason”) and replacing each 
incidence in the prospectus with the equivalent synthetic word. Naturally, this is a very tedious and 
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time consuming process, with 42 different compound words to search 189 documents, so macros in 
Microsoft Word were created to identify the expressions of interest, and remove the spaces between 
them. They are then able to be analysed by DICTION. 
In order for DICTION to count the frequencies of the relevant words that appear, the data must first 
be imported into the system. The prospectuses retrieved from the Companies Register were PDFs in 
the form of scanned images. In this format, they were incompatible with DICTION. The 
prospectuses were scanned with Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software into Microsoft 
Word format. In this process the prospectuses was edited, leaving only the relevant section for the 
study (i.e. the chairman’s report, letters to shareholders and managing director or chief executive’s 
report) and check the recognition accuracy of the software. In this process a few typographic errors 
from the recognition process were identified and corrected. After the input files were converted and 
imported into DICTION, the programme was able to scan through the documents in units of 500 
words and produced an output report detailing the frequencies of occurrences of words specified for 
detection within each of a number of dictionaries. The specific dictionaries are detailed in the next 
section. The output report was then exported to Microsoft Excel where the score for each hypothesis 
was calculated. 
5.5 Disclosure practices and deception 
The study examines whether stereotypical signs of deception as described in the psychology and 
linguistics literature were evident in New Zealand during the period leading up to, and including, 
the Global Financial Crisis. For this purpose, the voluntary disclosure portions of communication 
were essential, due to the flexibility of the authors to include or omit materials of interest. The 
Chairman’s Letters, Chief Executive’s Reports and Director’s Letters or equivalent (hereon as 
‘Chairman’s Letter’) were examined. Communication from the top can be a “subtly revealing 
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medium” (p. 46) of the presentation of the vision of a company, as well as the intended vision 
(Bournois & Point, 2006).  
The Companies Register’s online database contains the mandatory disclosure documents of all 
registered companies of New Zealand, including finance companies. Using the Deep Freeze List 
and the membership of the FSF, the Companies Register was examined and relevant prospectuses 
picked out. Thirty-two of the 65 failed finance companies did not include narrative portions in their 
prospectuses. As such, they were excluded from the failed sample. This brought the number of 
companies in the failed sample total down to 33. From the 33 failed companies, 127 different 
prospectuses from 2002 to 2010 were obtained for the relative and calendar timelines. For a 
prospectus to be selected, the disclosures must contain more information than the generic 
disclosures found in the Director’s Statement30. No specific selection criteria regarding format was 
set out so as to not restrict the already small sample size. Similarly, of the 33 non-failed finance 
companies in the FSF membership, nine companies’ prospectuses did not contain Chairman’s 
Letters, thus reducing the control sample to 24. The 24 control companies provided 62 different 
prospectuses for the relative timeline and 72 different prospectuses for analysis in the calendar 
timeline. In total, One hundred and eighty-nine different Chairmen’s letters of prospectuses from 57 
different finance companies were examined for the relative timeline, and 199 letters in prospectuses 
were examined in the calendar timeline. The control sample increased to 72 in the calendar timeline 
due to the way the data was sorted. The period examined spans from 2002 to 2010, due to the 
unavailability of data in either sample in 2000, 2001 and 2011. This range allowed the study to 
capture both the ‘boom’ period, and the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, and see how these 
events shape the disclosures in the registered prospectuses. This is discussed in further detail in the 
next section. 
                                                 
30
 That is, the paragraphs defining the scope of the director’s responsibility.  
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The objects of interest in the current paper are the disclosure practices of failed finance companies 
in comparison to those trading as a going concern. The paper examines whether the former are more 
likely to contain traits of ‘deceptive practices’ than the latter. Purda and Skillicorn (2012) provide 
evidence that truthful and fraudulent linguistic traits are “vastly different”, and therefore can be 
correctly classified using word lists. As with the approach used by other researchers, the definition 
of ‘deception’ includes only those done with intent, and therefore include incidences of ‘self-lies’ 
and hubris (See DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Included in the prospectuses and acting as the primary point of interest in the study, is the letter to 
investors written by the chairman, chief executive or managing director. The views and beliefs such 
disclosures communicate to the investors are perceived to be of great importance as this person is 
the “ultimate spokesman for the company” (Geppert & Lawrence, 2008 p. 288). However, there is 
debate over who actually composes such letters. The stance the current paper takes is that because 
the letter is signed off by the person who professes to be in such position, the disclosures are 
deemed to present that person’s views and are deemed to have been substantively prepared by that 
stated individual. The chairman’s letter is often rigorously reviewed to ensure that the desirable 
message is conveyed to the public, due to its wide availability (Geppert & Lawrence, 2008). Ingram 
and Frazier (1983) found that the chairman has considerable influence over the content of this sort 
of disclosure while Salancik and Meindl (1984) provide evidence the chairman’s writing style and 
word use in such documentation  remains similar, even with the help of external parties. The 
chairman or CEO’s correspondence with investors is therefore a useful indicator of the integrity of a 
corporation’s communications, and thus a good gauge of deception within corporations. 
In the deception literature, the general deception theory describes certain characteristics that help 
pinpoint deceptive disclosure practices in corporate disclosures. But ‘disclosure practices’ is a 
difficult word to define. As discussed earlier, there are no specific reporting standards governing the 
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universal structure of narrative disclosures. Section 240 (2) of the Crimes Act 1961 defines 
deception as:  
“[A] false representation, whether oral, documentary, or by conduct whereby the person making 
the representation intends to deceive any other person and know that it is false in a material 
particular; or is reckless as to whether it is false in a material particular; or an omission to 
disclose a material particular…”  
Such a definition is very broad, and provides no guidance as to what constitutes a particular 
disclosure to be deceptive, and requires the users of disclosures to know the intent of the preparers, 
which is almost always only available retrospectively. Similarly, section 39 of the Securities Act 
1978 set out the form and content of what is expected of the prospectus, but it does not provide 
further guidance or any exemplar upon which finance companies could base their disclosures31.  As 
such it is a difficult task to define ‘non-deceptive’ disclosure, let alone a deceptive one. Drawing on 
prior literature such as Hancock et al. (2005); Zhou et al. (2004); Larcker and Tayan (2010) and 
Newman et al. (2003), this study employs five key elements that collectively describe ‘deceptive 
disclosure practices’ to arrive at a ‘deception score’ to measure deception.  
Deception is measured by the following: 
• Lower frequency of first person pronouns 
• Higher frequency of negative emotive words 
• Lower frequency of exclusive words  
• Higher frequency of sensory words 
• Higher frequency of uncertainty words  
 
Such an approach to using prior literature to derive variables was also used in Beaver (1966), where 
a bankruptcy score was created in similar fashion. Purda and Skillicorn (2012) support the use of 
                                                 
31
 s39 of the Securities Act 1978 states “[T]he prospectus shall (a) be in writing and be dated; and (b) specify any 
documents required by section 41 of this Act to be endorsed on or attached to the prospectus or registered prospectus 
for the purposes of that section; and (c) contain all information, statements, certificates, and other matters that it is 
required to contain by regulations made under this Act.” 
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this “bag of words”32  approach, arguing that data generated word lists to classify truthful and 
fraudulent reports are an effective approach. These levels of incidence are relative to the incidence 
level found in the documents of firms that are not distressed (i.e. the control sample). Content 
analysis will be employed to determine if there are statistically significant differences between 
failed and non-failed finance companies in any one of these components. 
5.5.1 Components of the deception score 
The deception score is created by the sum of the five prominent signs of deception in psychology 
and linguistics literature. 
Deception score 
 =  Use of personal pronouns 
 + Use of negative emotives 
 + Use of descriptions 
 + Use of exclusion and causation words 
 + Higher frequency of uncertainty words  
 
Consequently, there are five variables making up the deception score, each defined by the relevant 
subcomponent of each component (shown in brackets) of DICTION. These subcomponents are 
discussed further in Table 1. 
Use of personal pronouns 
= Self Reference (Certainty) 
- Collectives (Certainty) 
- Cooperation (Commonality) 
As the Personal Pronoun component is made up of ‘Self Reference’ less ‘Collectives’ and 
‘Cooperation’, the higher the score, the more the writer refers to himself or herself in the report. A 
                                                 
32
 Such approach counts how many words appear in each document, then conducting statistical analysis (Purda & 
Skillicorn, 2012).  
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negative score indicates the writer tends to refer to a group, possibly in an attempt to not become 
solely responsible for the state of the corporation portrayed by the contents of the reports. 
Use of negative emotive words 
=  Blame (Optimism) 
+  Hardship (Optimism) 
+ Denial (Optimism) 
- Praise (Optimism) 
- Satisfaction (Optimism) 
- Inspiration (Optimism) 
The Negative Words component is made up of ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, ‘Denial’, ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’ 
and ‘Inspiration’, with the latter three being positive words, in contrast to the first three. As the 
positive words are subtracted from the score, a high score indicates the negativity of the author. 
Prior literature is of the view that such negativity may have resulted from the emotional guilt from 
deceptive behaviour (Hobson et al., 2011). 
Use of descriptive words 
= Aggression (Activity) 
+ Accomplishment (Activity) 
+ Communication (Activity) 
+ Motion (Activity) 
+ Cognitive Terms (Activity) 
+ Sensory (User Created – see Appendix II) 
The descriptive words component contains words which provide more information about a 
particular activity. The user-defined component, ‘Sensory’, contains basic adjectives which provide 
further elaboration to back up the writer’s words (to see the complete list of words contained in that 
dictionary, please direct your attention to appendix II). Deception literature provides conflicting 
findings. On the one hand deception may lead to the writer giving away detailed descriptions to 
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back up their falsified claims, but on the other, less details reduces the possibility of the lie being 
found out (Hancock et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & 
Tayan, 2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004). The higher the score, the more detail the 
writer is giving in their communications. The current study takes the approach that the more 
descriptive the disclosure is, the more likely the disclosure is to be deceptive. 
Exclusion and Causation (User defined – see Appendix I) 
The Exclusive and Causation Words component is a straight count of the relevant words prescribed 
by the user-defined dictionary. The higher the score, the more inclined the writer seems to be 
restrictive in communications to investors. Deceivers are predicted to be less restrictive in 
communication, as they do not wish to set unnecessary boundaries in their version of events. They 
will avoid being unduly precise in case their precision inconveniently causes contradictions in their  
Use words signalling uncertainty  
=  Ambivalence (Certainty)  
-  Leveling (Certainty)  
-  Tenacity (Certainty)  
- Insistence (Certainty)  
- Numerical Terms (Certainty)  
The degree of uncertainty component is comprised of ‘Ambivalence’ which hints at doubts and 
uncertainty, less ‘Levelling’, ‘Tenacity’, ‘Insistence’ and ‘Numerical Terms’, which provides 
certainty. The terms ‘Levelling’, ‘Tenacity’ and ‘Insistence’ are further discussed in Table 1, but in 
short convey a degree of confidence. Although existing deception literature does not provide 
empirical evidence on using the tone of words to signal certainty, this study is of the view that 
deceptive statements will portray more uncertainty. The author may attempt to avoid committing to 
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anything concrete in their untrue version of accounts as this might make their lies more susceptible 
to being found out. The higher the score, the more uncertain the writer appears to be. 
The below table shows how the DICTION components make up each variable of the deception 
score, and how this relates to the hypotheses identified in section 4: 
Table 1: The components of the deception score 
Hypothesis and 
Trait of Deception 
DICTION Sub-
Component 
(Component)  
Examples of 
Words included: 
Explanation 
H1A: The deception 
score of narrative 
disclosures by failed 
companies is 
significantly higher 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
failed companies. 
Aggregate of 
subcomponents 
discussed below.  
Includes all the 
words discussed 
below.  
=  Use of personal pronouns 
+  Use of negative emotives 
+  Use of descriptions 
+  Use of exclusion and causation             
words 
+  Use of uncertain words 
 
H2A: The use of 
personal association 
words in narrative 
disclosures by a 
failed company is 
significantly lower 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
failed companies, 
measurable at the 5% 
level of a Type I 
error. 
Self-Reference  
(Certainty) 
I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, 
I’ve, me, mine, 
my, myself. 
The main assumption of this sub-
component is that it is the writer that 
drives the action, and not the world at 
large. This will include the personal 
pronouns such as “I”. 
H2A Collectives 
(Certainty) 
crowd, choir, 
team, humanity, 
army, congress, 
legislature, staff 
This component contains words 
signalling plurality and reduces the 
sense of specificity, giving the 
impression that the action was 
conducted by a group, and not by 
certain individuals. 
H2A Cooperation 
(Commonality) 
unions, 
schoolmates, 
caucus, chum, 
partner, cronies, 
teamwork, 
sharing, 
contribute 
Words that describe the interactions 
of groups of people. It suggests that 
the action was not conducted with the 
involvement of someone else, and 
hence the responsibility should also 
be attributed to the other party.  
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H3A: The use of 
negative emotive 
words in narrative 
disclosures by a 
failed company is 
significantly higher 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
failed companies, 
measurable at the 5% 
level of a Type I 
error. 
Blame (Optimism) mean, naive, 
sloppy, stupid, 
fascist, blood-
thirsty, repugnant, 
malicious, 
bankrupt, rash, 
morbid, 
embarrassing, 
weary, nervous, 
painful, 
detrimental 
Includes negative adjectives 
undermining a certain action or 
object, and other unfortunate or 
unplanned circumstances.    
H3A Hardship 
(Optimism) 
earthquake, 
starvation, 
tornado, 
pollution, killers, 
bankruptcy, 
enemies, vices   
External and internal events 
detrimental to the organisation, for 
example, natural disasters, political 
unrests and human behaviour.  
H3A Denial (Optimism) aren’t, shouldn’t, 
don’t, nor, not, 
nay   
Contains words that try to contradict 
or negate responsibility. 
H3A Praise (Optimism) dear, delightful, 
witty, mighty, 
handsome, 
beautiful, shrewd, 
bright, vigilant, 
reasonable, 
successful, 
conscientious, 
renowned, 
faithful, good, 
noble 
Contains words with confirmation of 
a person’s positive attributes. 
H3A Satisfaction 
(Optimism) 
Cheerful ,passion
ate, happiness, 
thanks, smile, 
welcome, excited, 
fun, lucky, 
celebrating, pride, 
auspicious, 
healing, 
encourage, 
secure, relieved. 
Contains words of positive emotions, 
including moments of triumph. 
H3A Inspiration 
(Optimism) 
Faith, honesty, 
self-sacrifice, 
virtue, courage, 
dedication, 
wisdom, mercy, 
Contains words of aspirations of 
positive attributes desired by people. 
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patriotism, 
success, 
education, justice. 
H4A: The use of 
sensory descriptive 
words in narrative 
disclosures by a 
failed company is 
significantly higher 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
failed companies, 
measurable at the 5% 
level of a Type I 
error. 
Aggression 
(Activities) 
Blast, crash, 
explode, collide, 
conquest, 
attacking, 
dictatorships, 
violation, goal, 
crusade, 
commanded, 
challenging, 
overcome, 
mastered, 
rambunctious, 
pushy, prod, 
poke, pound, 
shove, dismantle, 
demolish, 
overturn, veto, 
prevent, reduce, 
defend, curbed 
Contains words that imply human 
force and action. It also includes 
actions as a result of personal 
triumph and resistance. 
H4A Accomplishment 
(Activities)  
establish, finish, 
influence, 
proceed, 
motivated, 
influence, leader, 
manage, buy, 
produce, 
employees, sell, 
grow, increase, 
generate, 
construction, 
handling, 
strengthen, 
succeed, outputs, 
agenda, enacted, 
working, 
leadership 
Contains words that imply 
completion of tasks and the human 
behaviour and actions that assist this. 
 Communication 
(Activities) 
listen, interview, 
read, speak, film, 
videotape, 
telephone, e-mail, 
translate, quote , 
scripts, broadcast, 
chat, declare , 
flatter, demand, 
reporter, 
spokesperson, 
advocates, 
preacher, hint, 
Contains words that include 
interaction, and means of interaction. 
65 
  
rebuke, respond, 
persuade 
H4A Motion (Activities) bustle, job, lurch, 
leap, circulate, 
momentum, 
revolve, twist, 
barnstorm, jaunt, 
wandering, 
travels, lickety-
split, nimble, zip, 
whistle-stop, ride, 
fly, glide, swim 
Contains words that include human 
motion, and the details of the action. 
H4A Cognitive terms 
(Activities) 
learn, deliberate, 
consider, 
compare, biology, 
psychology, logic, 
economics, 
question, forget, 
re-examine, 
paradoxes, 
graduation, 
teaching, 
classrooms, 
invent, perceive, 
speculate, 
interpret, 
estimate, 
examine, 
reasonable, 
strategies, 
diagnose 
The details of the action, including 
the reasoning behind the action. 
H4A Sensory Dictionary 
(User Defined) 
See appendix II Includes words that provide 
additional information about a said 
matter. 
H5A: The use of 
exclusive words in 
narrative disclosures 
by a failed company 
is significantly lower 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
failed companies, 
measurable at the 5% 
level of a Type I 
error. 
 
Exclusion and 
Causation 
Dictionary (User 
Defined) 
See appendix I Includes words that restrict the scope 
of the written media, by providing 
for boundaries and reasoning. 
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H6A: The degree of 
certainty in narrative 
disclosures by a 
distressed company 
are significantly less 
than that of 
disclosures by non-
distressed companies, 
measurable at the 5% 
level of a Type I 
error.  
Ambivalence 
(Certainty)  
allegedly, 
perhaps, might, 
almost, 
approximate, 
vague, 
somewhere, 
baffled, puzzling, 
hesitate, could, 
would, he’d, 
dilemma, guess, 
suppose, seems  
Contains words implying the author’s 
unwillingness to commit to past 
written statements. It includes any 
words to undermine the tone of 
certainty.  
H6A  Levelling 
(Certainty)  
everybody, 
anyone, each, 
fully, always, 
completely, 
inevitably, 
consistently, 
unconditional, 
consummate, 
absolute, open-
and-shut  
Contains words to build a sense of 
completeness and assurance, thus 
adding to the certainty of the written 
statements.  
H6A  Tenacity 
(Certainty)  
is, am, will, shall 
has, must, do, 
he’ll, they’ve, 
ain’t  
Contains definite verb forms and 
other verbs that imply confidence 
and entirety.  
H6A   Insistence 
(Certainty)  
(Words x Sum of 
Occurrence)/10  
Measures repetition of words, as 
repetition of words indicates 
preference of an ordered world.  
H6A Numerical 
terms(Certainty)  
one, tenfold, 
hundred, zero, 
subtract, divide, 
multiply, 
percentage, 
digitize, tally, 
mathematics  
Contains any numerical figure, 
including dates, that provides 
additional support for the stated 
argument.  
The scores of failed and non-failed company will be added up and the statistical significance of 
differences in mean scores between samples is then determined by a t-test.  
           
(1)
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The sample mean D is the average of DICTION scores. The population mean, µ is the is the mean 
of DICTION scores obtained from the corresponding control sample. This assumes that the sample 
of control firms is fairly and truly representative of the population of finance firms in general. This 
is reasonable due to the size of the overall population of finance companies in NZ.  The difference 
between the average and population mean is divided by s, the sample standard deviation divided by 
the square root of n, the sample size. The t-test determines whether the means of the disclosure 
levels of failed and viable firms are statistically different from each other, and provides guidance on 
whether the null hypotheses should be kept.  
This result is cross checked by the Kruskal Wallis test: 
            (2) 
         
Where   
T= Aggregate score of all prospectuses examined 
N= Total number of prospectuses studied 
n= Number of firms in that category 
The H statistic and associated p-value will indicate to us whether to accept or reject the study’s null 
hypothesis, based on the study’s confidence level. The hypotheses will be rejected if the F statistic, 
when following the F distribution, is greater than the 5% level of significance (indicated by the 
corresponding p-value). As the Kruskal-Wallis test is non-parametric and therefore does not require 
the data to be normally distributed (Dalgaard, 2008), it is arguably better suited to provide robust 
results.   
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The next chapter will examine the analysis of the prospectuses collected of the finance companies 
in the failed and control samples. In each of the topics of interest (i.e. the relative timeline and the 
calendar time sample), a table with the descriptive statistics, and graphical presentations of the 
mean and median scores will be compiled. Included within the table of descriptive statistic are the 
mean, median maximum and minimum scores for each sample in each of the time periods. The 
count of how many prospectuses made up those scores is also recorded. These scores are 
determined by DICTION, and the relevant variables aggregated by Microsoft Excel. Having both 
the mean and median score will help determine whether the results are indicative of the general 
trend of the sample, or distortions by a few extreme results. DICTION examines the text in units of 
500 words (Hart, 2000). For prospectuses over 500 words, the default approach, and the approach 
taken by the current study, divided the total word count of the prospectus into units of 500 words, 
and the particular score was the averages of the scores of the units. 
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6. Results           
This chapter analyses the 189 prospectuses from the 57 finance companies in both the failed and 
control samples, and determines whether there are different disclosure practices between finance 
companies in distress and those that are not. The analysis is split into two sections:  
1. Relative Time Sample 
2. Calendar Time Sample 
 
The relative timeline looks at the scores from six years before, to the year of collapse for the failed 
sample, in comparison to the control sample. The control sample is made up of ‘non-failed’ finance 
companies with available information, matched in calendar time to automatically assume the same 
relative time for comparison. This section will help ascertain whether there are different disclosure 
practices between the two samples in the years leading up to, and including, collapse. Drawing from 
Anderson and Chang (2010), and Frino et al. (2007), the market usually has indications of financial 
distress well in advance, as indicated by the occurrence of negative abnormal returns several years 
before the year of collapse. The market may be informed through insider trading and networking, or 
through investors’ correct interpretation of company communications (Frino et al., 2007; Morris, 
1997). This may be possible through the increasing sophistication of investors (Chandra & 
Greenball, 1978). Management are also usually aware of this pending financial distress in advance, 
and will be motivated to placate the market, to prevent unfavourable reactions. Drawing from prior 
literature, the failed sample should return higher deception scores than the control sample. The 
calendar timeline looks at the prospectuses from 2002 to 2010, and this section shows how the 
Global Financial Crisis affected the both the failed and control samples, and eliminates external 
forces in the different disclosure practices.  
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6.1 Relative timeline 
This section first examines the deception score on the whole, then the subsequent sections examine 
the five components that make up the score, to identify which components, if any, are the key 
drivers for this difference in disclosure practices. 
6.1.1 The overall deception score 
The first hypothesis, H1A, posits: 
H1A: The deception score of narrative disclosures by a failed company is significantly 
higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 2: Summary of the deception score 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Failed  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
U
n
til
 
C
o
lla
ps
e Mean Median Count Min Max 
T-test of 
Difference (P-
value) 
-6 -192.60 -152.28   9 -358.72 -52.26 0.33 
-5 -422.25 -169.43 17 -4132.85 -45.32 0.34 
-4 -232.80 -102.72 21 -1718.66 -46.11 0.49 
-3 -261.39 -206.46 26 -1337.22 -54.5 0.23 
-2 -321.98 -188.24 22 -1725.16 -81.28 *0.06 
-1 -385.90 -274.58 22 -1659.75 -38.18 0.29 
0 -669.02 -616.29 10 -1627.85 -40.18 0.91 
 
Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Min Max 
Kruskal 
Wallis Test 
(P-value) 
-6 -156.08 -137.69 8 -322.67 -33.35 0.39 
-5 -193.88 -130.31 8 -836.17 -21.26 0.22 
-4 -177.15 -78.20 9 -838.87 -33.53 0.14 
-3 -196.41 -122.49 8 -708.86 -27.95 0.18 
-2 -491.90 -190.79 10 -2598.68 -40.13 0.96 
-1 -299.32 -205.91 10 -1033.05 -96.72 0.57 
0 -688.64 -77.26 9 -4724.89 -31.52 *0.08 
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Figure 3: Deception score in the relative timeline – mean scores 
 
Figure 4: Deception score in the relative timeline – median scores 
 
The deception score is created by the sum of the five prominent signs of deception in psychology 
and linguistics literature described in Section 5.1: 
 =  Use of personal pronouns 
 + Use of negative emotives 
 + Use of descriptions 
 + Use of exclusion and causation words 
 + Higher frequency of uncertainty words  
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The higher the score, the more deceptive the written prospectus appears to be in the years leading 
up to collapse. However, a positive score does not necessarily indicate deceptive behaviour, while 
similarly, a negative score does not rule out deceptive behaviour. What is important is the relative 
magnitude of differences, indicating the relative degrees of potential deception between the two 
samples. 
As depicted in Figures 3 and 4, the failed sample returned generally lower (and relatively less 
deceptive) deception scores than the control sample. Interestingly, in year 0 both the mean and 
median score for the failed sample dropped to their lowest readings of -669.02 and -616.29 
respectively. The control sample followed suit with respect to mean score, dropping to -688.64 in 
year 0 while the median was and -77.26. The median score tends to suggest that the low mean score 
from the control sample is only from a few extreme results. Overall the results show that the failed 
sample is not considered to be deceptive compared to the control sample. On the surface it would 
seem counter intuitive that the failed sample is less ‘deceptive’, given they have more incentive to 
deceive. One interpretation of this result is that the relatively lower deceptive scores by the failed 
sample may signal more deception due to intentional manipulation of the statements to remain un-
deceptive. Moreover, finance companies that did provide truthful news about their performance 
may be harming their own survival. Companies are well aware of this self-fulfilling prophecy and 
the effect their words have on the general public (Craig et al., 2012).  
As the failed sample appears to return lower (i.e. relatively less deceptive) mean and median 
deception scores (five of the seven years examined respectively), H1A is not provisionally supported. 
In order to examine possible factors which contribute to the counter-intuitive result, the next 
sections will examine each component of the deception score in detail. 
6.1.2 Use of personal pronouns 
The first part of the analysis will look at the plausibility of H2A. 
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H2A: The use of personal association words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 3: Summary of use of personal pronouns 
 
Failed  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
U
n
til
 
 
C
o
lla
ps
e 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference (P-
value) 
-6 15.75 12.62 9 39.99 8.00 *0.05 
-5 21.48 12.75 17 98.19 0.60 0.78 
-4 16.25 11.20 21 49.41 5.09 **0.04 
-3 23.30 21.53 26 66.25 8.00 0.13 
-2 24.66 21.69 22 56.71 6.45 0.72 
-1 26.61 22.78 22 53.96 11.00 *0.06 
 0 24.75 19.44 10 65.20 5.70 0.72 
 
Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal Wallis 
Test (P-value) 
-6 23.11 18.07 8 46.37 13.00 *0.09 
-5 23.00 22.64 8 38.82 7.70 *0.05 
-4 21.73 18.62 9 38.82 10.00 0.24 
-3 19.38 15.31 8 34.00 6.07 **0.04 
-2 23.70 19.99 10 56.75 12.46 0.43 
-1 21.79 23.87 10 37.10 0.00 0.76 
 0 22.81 17.44 9 76.14 1.12 0.54 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
Figure 5: Use of personal pronouns in the relative timeline – mean scores 
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Figure 6: Use of personal pronouns in the relative timeline – median scores 
 
The lower the score, the more deceptive the prospectus appears to be as the components of the score 
are: 
= Self Reference (Certainty) 
-   Collectives (Certainty) 
- Cooperation (Commonality) 
Figure 5 examines the mean scores of the use of personal pronouns from six years before the failure 
date to the actual year of collapse. The results show that between six and four years before the year 
of collapse, the failed sample used fewer self-reference words than the control sample, indicated by 
the lower mean score. The difference was statistically significant per the t-test at the 10% level in 
year -6, the 5% level in year -4, and at the 1% level in year -1, per Table 3. This is in agreement 
with prior literature, which suggested deceivers would use fewer self-references. However, from 
years -3 to the year of collapse, the results are reversed, with the control sample returning lower 
personal pronoun scores, suggesting that during the years leading up to year in which the failed 
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also lower than those of the control sample between years -6 and -4, and the reverse from three 
years until year zero.  Generally Figures 5 and 6 show no significant trends in the use of personal 
pronouns, with fluctuations in both samples. However, a slight decreasing trend is noted in the 
failed sample from years -4 to 0 in Figure 5. This suggests that those authors started to distance 
themselves from their company during the years when they suspected that things had started to 
deteriorate. This is especially so as from years -3 to 0 the failed sample returned higher personal 
pronoun score than the control sample. However, this trend is not evident in the median scores in 
Figure 6, suggesting that the trend evident in the mean scores was created by a few extreme results.  
Based on Figures 5 and 6, and Table 3, personal pronouns showed statistically significant 
differences at the 5% level in year -4, and weaker significance at the 10% level in year -1 and -6. 
Similarly, only weak and mild significances were found using the Kruskal Wallis test. Overall, H2A, 
which asserts that the use of personal association words in narrative disclosures by a failed 
company will be significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies was not 
supported (i.e. there was a failure to reject the null hypothesis) as the failed sample does not appear 
to use fewer personal pronouns leading up to the date of collapse. 
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6.1.3 Use of negative emotion words 
This section will examine H3A: 
H3A: The use of negative emotive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 4: Summary of use of negative emotives 
 
 Failed  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
U
n
til
 
 
C
o
lla
ps
e 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value 
-6 -14.05 -15.33 9 -8.12 20.12 ***0.00 
-5 -17.49 -17.00 17 -4.68 56.44 ***0.00 
-4 -14.57 -13.68 21 -3.12 -33.14 ***0.00 
-3 -16.75 -15.66 26 -4.10 44.22 ***0.00 
-2 -18.66 -14.68 22 -3.98 70.58 **0.01 
-1 -15.68 -15.41 22 -4.12 43.14 ***0.00 
 0 -14.68 -17.67 10 -1.57 28.12 **0.03 
 Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis 
Test (P-
value) 
-6 -8.51 -8.93 8 0.56 -17.42 **0.02 
-5 -7.22 -6.65 8 0.88 -15.1 **0.03 
-4 -8.31 -9.72 9 4.32 -15.1 ***0.00 
-3 -6.03 -6.31 8 -13.92 2.35 *0.07 
-2 -10.85 -7.93 10 -1.64 -29.42 ***0.00 
-1 -6.78 -7.02 10 2.35 -15.22 *0.06 
 0 -7.65 -10.43 9 6.55 -14.78 0.42 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 7: Use of negative words in the relative timeline – mean scores 
 
Figure 8: Use of negative words in the relative timeline – median scores 
 
Figure 7 and 8 looks at the use of negative words, which is made up of the components below: 
=  Blame (Optimism) 
+  Hardship (Optimism) 
+ Denial 
- Praise (Optimism) 
- Satisfaction (Optimism) 
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- Inspiration (Optimism) 
A high score indicates negativity on the part of the author, as the positive components are deducted 
from the negative components. Scores greater than zero indicate that the writer has used more 
pessimistic or negative words, leading to an overall negative tone. Similarly, a score lower than zero 
score will indicate that the writer has used more optimistic or positive words, leading to an overall 
positive tone. This, as suggested by Hobson et al. (2011), can imply the deceptiveness of the author, 
as the physical and mental discomfort of the author can impact on word usage. Surprisingly, the 
tone used by failed companies was more “positive”, and significantly so, as indicated by the lower 
mean and median scores. The mean scores for the control companies range from -.8.51 to -10.85, 
compared to -14.05 and -18.66 for failed companies. There does not appear to be any time within 
the research period in which this situation reverses; the failed sample remains more positive for the 
entire time. They are more positive as the company heads towards collapse. Interestingly, the 
control sample returned higher negative words scores in the period examined. Intuitively, the 
control sample should have either more favourable news than the failed sample, or at the very least, 
less negative conations in their communications. Caso et al. (2005) shed some light on why the 
control sample would be returning a high (i.e. more negative) score. They argue that since both 
deceivers and truth tellers benefit from the audience accepting their version of events (be they true 
or not), both would feel some discomfort from the pressure and therefore both would try and appear 
convincing. However, as the failed sample returned lower (and less negative) scores than the control 
sample, this suggests that the failed sample were aware of their dire positions and as a result, they 
actively and artificially distorted their communications to appear less negative. 
Overall, all years had returned statistical readings at the 1% and 5% level. However, by looking at 
Figures 5 and 6, we see that although there are statistically significant differences as we have 
expected, the failed sample was actually statistically more positive than the control sample, as 
indicated by the consistent lower mean and median scores. This seems to hint that that unlike the 
non-failed firms, failing firms are consciously making an effort to appear more positive, in an 
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attempt to compensate their declining performance. Of the five variables examined, the Kruskal 
Wallis test identified only the use of negative words to be significant at the 1% level in years -4 and 
-2, mild significance at the 5% level in years -6 and -5, and weak significance at 10% for years -3 
and -1. The Kruskal Wallis test could not find any differences between uses of negative emotive 
terms in the year of collapse, which was not the case in Table 4. Based on the results as shown in 
Table 4 and Figures 7 and 8, H3A was not supported (that is the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected), as the control sample returned higher (and therefore more negative or pessimistic) scores 
than the failed sample. 
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6.1.4 Use of descriptive words 
This section examines H4A: 
H4A: The use of sensory descriptive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 5: Summary of use of descriptive words  
 
Failed  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
U
n
til
 
 
C
o
lla
ps
e 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
-6 25.89 24.42 9 45.50 -15.00 **0.02 
-5 43.38 31.71 17 209.42 -15.25 0.57 
-4 32.55 27.17 21 94.23 13.00 0.97 
-3 40.67 34.86 26 117.91 -13.50 *0.06 
-2 43.58 38.85 22 93.23 -10.50 0.89 
-1 42.31 40.75 22 76.65 -20.23 0.62 
0 59.56 62.84 10 111.23 -10.00 **0.03 
 
Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis 
Test (P-
value) 
-6 35.28 35.28 8 60.84 14.91 0.60 
-5 37.25 32.92 8 64.55 21.83 0.80 
-4 32.70 27.33 9 64.55 14.91 0.37 
-3 31.70 32.35 8 50.21 12.29 0.76 
-2 44.17 36.24 10 97.44 24.29 0.74 
-1 40.73 35.82 10 77.08 15.00 0.38 
0 38.71 31.28 9 102.28 16.23 0.31 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 9: Use of descriptive words in the relative timeline – mean scores 
 
Figure 10: Use of descriptive words in the relative timeline – median scores 
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The use of descriptive words is measured by an aggregate of components that provides more 
information regarding a particular activity. 
Higher frequency of descriptive words 
= Aggression (Activity) 
+ Accomplishment (Activity) 
+ Communication (Activity) 
+ Motion (Activity) 
+ Sensory (User Created – see Appendix II) 
+ Cognitive Terms (Activity) 
The higher the score, the greater the usage of descriptive words in the examined prospectus, the 
more deceptive they appear. Drawing from prior literature, it is unclear whether being more 
descriptive is more deceptive. Some authors (for example, Hancock et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 
2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004) 
assert that more details provide more support for a deceiver’s version of events; while papers such 
as Marett and George Marett and George (2004) claim that fewer details provide fewer 
opportunities for deceivers to slip up in their lies. The current paper supports the former view, 
arguing that deceivers will provide more information in their disclosures, due to potential waffly 
and floral descriptions. Figures 9 and 10 show both the mean and median descriptive word scores. 
This is shown by their higher scores for all years, apart from year -6. Failed companies consistently 
provided more information than the control sample (apart from year -6). The difference is even 
more prominent in the year of collapse, with the failed sample’s mean and median score spiking at 
59.56 and 62.84 respectively, in comparison to 38.71 and 31.28 for the control sample. Figures 9 
and 10 show an increasing trend of providing more information as the failed sample reaches 
collapse, possibly as an attempt to convince the investors’ of their worth, or perhaps as admission to 
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their deeds. However, conversely there are no clear trends in the control sample, with the range 
staying around low thirties to forties. This portrays a difference in disclosure strategies of the two 
samples. 
Use of descriptive words yielded statistically significant results in years -6, -3 and 0. The statistical 
significances for these years were at the 5%, 10% and 5% levels respectively. The Kruskall Wallis 
test returned no statistically significant results. Although the scores for the failed sample appears to 
be increasing (and therefore they appear to be providing more information) as they are closer to 
collapse, this difference was not statistically significant for most years. Based on Table 5 and 
Figures 9 and 10, H4A is not supported provisionally (i.e. there is a failure to reject the null), as the 
current study only found weak support. 
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6.1.5 Use of exclusion and causation words 
Section 6.1.4 examines H5A, which describes the use of exclusive and causation words: 
H5A:  The use of exclusive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 6: Summary of use of exclusive and causation words  
 
Failed  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
to
  
C
o
lla
ps
e 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
-6 19.55 12 9 48 5 0.39 
-5 29.18 20 17 148 12 0.53 
-4 21.76 20 21 64 5 0.99 
-3 28.27 26 26 84 12 0.12 
-2 32.00 26.5 22 70 15 *0.09 
-1 37.32 37 22 65 8 **0.04 
0 39.80 38 10 71 13 0.11 
 
Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis 
Test (P-
value) 
-6 24.12 20 8 48 11 0.27 
-5 24.33 18 8 48 16 0.60 
-4 21.75 19 9 47 11 0.13 
-3 23.70 17 8 63 8 0.69 
-2 37.70 32.5 10 85 19 0.57 
-1 30.44 26 10 60 9 0.22 
0 29.38 17 9 104 9 0.31 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 11: Use of exclusive and causation words in the relative timeline – mean scores      
 
Figure 12: Use of exclusive and causation words in the relative timeline – median scores      
 
The mean and median exclusive and causation scores are shown in Figures 11 and 12. The score is 
a word count of the frequencies of exclusive or causation words and there is only one component 
that makes up the score: 
= Exclusion and Causation (User defined – see Appendix I) 
A higher the score indicates that a company is restrictive in the information they provide, as they 
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a deceiver could be bound by unnecessary restrictions that may create contradictions in a false 
version of events. This has the potential to uncover their carefully hidden lies. In the year of 
collapse, the failed sample used more restrictive words, 39.8 on average compared to 29.38 for the 
control sample. The difference is more pronounced in Figure 12, where the median scores are 
examined. In year 0 the failed sample returns a median score of 38, which is significantly higher 
than 17, which is the median score returned by the control sample. Despite a sharp decrease in year 
-4 in both Figures 11 and 12, the general trend for both samples is that the use of exclusive and 
causation words tends to increase as we approach the year of collapse. Apart from years -6 and -2, 
the failed sample returns higher mean and median scores than the control sample. In effect, the 
failed sample is more restrictive in their disclosures. One possible rationale for this is the nature of 
the user defined dictionary. The dictionary contains more words that can potentially divert 
responsibility such as “however” and “for that reason”. Therefore, as the finance company 
experiences distress and moves towards collapse, they may want to apportion the blame on to others. 
Contrary to the study’s initial expectations of the word usage, this shift in blame has been apparent 
in other retrospective analyses in narrates associated with of corporate collapses. For example, this 
was found by Craig et al. (2012), in the writings of a former executive of a prominent Indian 
company. 
 
In terms of the t-test, use of exclusive and causation words had only two statistically significant 
readings: at the 10% level in year -2, and at the 5% level in year -1. The Kruskal Wallis test 
returned no significant results. In light of Table 6 and Figures 11 and 12, H5A is not provisionally 
supported, as the failed sample does not use significantly fewer restrictive words than their non-
failed counterparts.  
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6.1.6 Use of words of uncertainty  
This section looks at words signalling uncertainty in written prospectuses, and H6A. 
H6A:  The degree of certainty in narrative disclosures by a distressed company is significantly 
less than that of disclosures by non-distressed companies. 
Table 7: Summary of words signalling uncertainty 
 
Failed 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
to
 C
o
lla
ps
e 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
-6  -200.64  -164.30  9  -63.60  -367.45  0.60  
-5  -440.37  -177.80  17  -65.20  -4236.02  0.37  
-4  -244.13  -112.25  21  -57.60  -1771.70  0.60  
-3  -280.34  -226.72  26  -54.70  -1393.16  0.26  
-2  -339.56  -205.65  22  -106.60  -1778.20  *0.06  
-1  -401.81  -295.23  22  -73.55  -1647.76  0.44  
0  -698.85  -640.76  10  -90.90  -1683.80  0.93  
 
Control  
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis 
Test (P-
value) 
-6  -181.82  -149.25  8  -51.20  -355.40  0.51  
-5  -222.57  -144.00  8  -39.40  -877.00  0.50  
-4  -201.53  -93.05  9  -64.80  -880.70  0.27  
-3  -217.76  -143.45  8  -56.20  -753.30  0.27  
-2  -511.22  -208.45  10  -62.70  -2638.45  0.34  
-1  -324.61  -238.60  10  -101.60  -1081.30  0.41  
0  -713.13  -81.70  9  -52.20  -4805.86  0.46  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 13: Use of words signalling uncertainty in the relative timeline – mean scores  
 
Figure 14: Use of words signalling uncertainty in the relative timeline – median scores 
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Uncertainty is a big consideration in investment decisions, and therefore is an essential factor in a 
finance company’s survival. The use of words signalling Uncertainty measures this factor using the 
following components:  
= Ambivalence (Certainty)  
- Leveling (Certainty)  
- Tenacity (Certainty)  
- Insistence (Certainty)  
- Numerical Terms (Certainty)  
As ‘Ambivalence’ contains words that portray doubt, the higher the score, the more uncertain the 
author appears to be. The mean scores as shown in Figure 13 show that despite a slight dip in year -
5, there is a very convincing decrease in the Uncertainty Score. This means that as we approach the 
year of collapse, the failed sample appears increasingly more certain. Figure 13 also shows the same 
trend for the control sample, in that despite a slight peak in year -1, the control sample appears to be 
quite certain by year 0, as indicated by the significant negative score.  
However, in contrast, the median scores (as shown in Figure 14) tell a different story. Although the 
failed sample drops past -600, the control sample actually increases at year 0, signalling that they 
are more uncertain than the failed sample. Figure 13 is possibly skewed by a few extreme scores, 
due to the significant spread for year 0 in the control sample as shown in Table 7 (maximum -52.20, 
minimum -4805.86). Both Figure 13 and 14 are in agreement that the failed sample appears to be 
increasingly less uncertain as we approach the year of collapse.  
Interestingly, H6A yielded only one significant result at the 10% level in year -2. Moreover, the 
Kruskal Wallis test did not return any statistically significant results. Based on Table 7 and, Figures 
13 and 14, it would appear that the degree of certainty in narrative disclosures by a distressed 
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company is not significantly less than that of disclosures by non-distressed companies. On that basis, 
we did not find support for H6A. 
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6.2 Calendar timeline 
6.2.1 The overall deception score – calendar timeline 
As described in Section 5.6, the higher the score, the more deceptive the author of the prospectuses 
of the finance companies appears to be as the deception score is made up of:  
 =  Use of personal pronouns 
 + Use of negative emotives 
 + Use of descriptions 
 + Use of exclusion and causation words 
 + Higher frequency of uncertainty words  
 
This study strives to examine whether the word use of failed and non-failed finance companies 
differ in corporate disclosures. This mainly achieved by relative timelines, as described in the 
previous section. As a result, the following hypothesis was derived: 
H1A: The deception score of narrative disclosures by a failed company is significantly 
higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
However, classifying the samples based on the calendar year to standardise external influences is 
also a point of interest. This section will now group the prospectuses based on the calendar timeline 
to identify trends that arose from external pressures to the finance companies. 
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Table 8: Summary of deception scores (calendar time sample) 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Failed  
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010 -712.55 -563.32 4 -93.71 -1629.85 0.07 
2009 -397.84 -307.61 5 -50.27 -983.75 0.78 
2008 -692.62 -617.39 8 -105.14 -1288.49 ***0.00 
2007 -481.70 -226.80 18 -40.18 -1659.75 ***0.00 
2006 -251.87 -191.67 20 -38.18 -1310.5 0.31 
2005 -327.03 -217.48 23 -54.50 -1725.16 ***0.00 
2004 -282.77 -193.93 21 -64.53 -1718.66 ***0.00 
2003 -162.45 -150.59 16 -45.11 -324.48 0.29 
2002 -135.28 -111.32 8 -52.26 -337.37 0.63 
 
Control  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis Test 
(P-value) 
2010 -297.87 -205.91 9 -96.72 -1033.05 0.41 
2009 -499.80 -183.19 10 -89.30 -2598.68 0.54 
2008 -194.95 -122.49 10 -27.95 -709.86 **0.02 
2007 -177.28 -78.20 8 -33.53 -838.87 0.24 
2006 -193.88 -130.31 9 -21.26 -836.17 0.22 
2005 -154.70 -137.69 8 -33.35 -322.67 **0.02 
2004 -132.09 -114.53 8 -50.43 -376.18 **0.01 
2003 -199.38 -160.05 7 -52.32 -491.09 1.00 
2002 -116.76 -63.60 3 -48.58 -238.11 0.54 
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Figure 15: Deception scores in the calendar time sample – mean scores 
 
Figure 16: Deception scores in the calendar time sample – median scores 
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down to -692.62 and -617.39 respectively. After a slight rise to -391.84 and -307.61 in 2009, the 
deception score plummeted again to -712.55 and -536.32 in 2010. During these three years, the 
deception scores for the control sample stayed in the vicinity of -122.49 to -499.80, considerable 
higher (and more deceptive) than the failed sample. The trough in 2008 is noteworthy as it signals 
how external factors such as the Global Financial Crisis can impact on written prospectuses, due to 
the uncertainty in the market. As the mean and median scores show similar movements in troughs 
and spikes, this indicates that the high scores are not a distortion by a few high readings, but 
possibly by the general activity of the entire failed sample.  
Generally a slight decreasing trend was found in the failed samples in Figures 15 and 16, expect for 
the spike in 2009, as described above. The control sample scores remained relatively constant, 
except for a fall in 2009 in the mean scores (which was not reflected by the median scores). 
Although Table 8 shows statistically significant differences, as the control sample returned higher 
scores than the failed sample, H1A is not provisionally supported.  
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6.2.2 Use of personal pronouns – calendar timeline 
Section 6.2.2 examines H2A, which looks at the use of Personal pronouns in the calendar timeline. 
H2A: The use of personal association words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 9: Summary of the use of personal pronouns (calendar time sample) 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Failed  
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010 27.79 18.64 4 65.20 8.70 0.67 
2009 31.30 33.00 5 45.99 8.00 0.33 
2008 24.81 16.47 8 53.07 14.82 0.37 
2007 23.81 21.25 18 40.75 10.75 0.61 
2006 24.17 20.87 20 56.71 6.45 0.77 
2005 23.43 21.28 23 66.25 8.00 0.99 
2004 22.30 19.00 21 49.25 8.00 0.39 
2003 14.07 11.10 16 49.36 0.60 0.12 
2002 10.47 8.84 8 25.87 2.00 0.77 
 
Control  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis Test 
(P-value) 
2010 21.79 23.87 9 37.10 0.00 1.00 
2009 23.70 19.99 10 56.75 12.46 **0.02 
2008 19.38 15.31 10 34.00 6.07 0.82 
2007 21.73 18.62 8 38.82 10.00 0.96 
2006 23.00 22.64 9 38.82 7.70 0.81 
2005 23.49 18.07 8 49.37 13.00 0.50 
2004 19.58 18.50 8 31.12 14.37 0.18 
2003 23.31 19.00 7 47.32 10.87 0.17 
2002 12.14 8.57 3 21.37 6.47 0.75 
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Figure 17: Use of personal pronouns in the calendar time sample – mean scores 
 
Figure 18: Use of personal pronouns in the calendar time sample – median scores 
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= Self Reference (Certainty) 
-   Collectives (Certainty) 
- Cooperation (Commonality) 
So in effect, the lower the use of personal pronouns score, the more deceptive the written prospectus 
appears to be. 
Figures 17 and 18 describe the use of personal pronouns by both the failed and control samples 
from 2002 through to 2010. The failed sample returned higher (and therefore less ‘deceptive’) 
scores from 2004 onwards, but returned lower scores in the first two years of the study, and in 2005. 
The range of mean scores for the failed sample is 10.47 to 31.30, in comparison to 12.14 to 23.31 
for the control sample, as shown in Table 9. This suggests that although in 2002 and 2003, the 
failed sample used relatively less personal language in their written prospectus; they become 
increasingly less personal through time in comparison to the control sample. Figure 19 shows a 
general increase in the use of personal pronouns on the failed sample in the period examined, 
however the increase from 2003 to 2004 in the failed sample was quite significant, almost doubling, 
from 14.07 to 22.30. In 2009 the mean scores returned another spike, to 31.30, which in 2010 
dropped back down to 27.79. The median scores in Figure 18 shows a similar story, with the failed 
sample appearing more personal in 2002 to 2003, but later becoming less personal in the subsequent 
years, similar to the failed sample. In contrast to Figure 17 and the mean scores, the median score of 
the failed sample returned higher (and therefore less personal and more ‘deceptive’ scores) in 2005 
and 2007.  The spike in 2009 (to 33) appears to be more significant in contrast to the mean score, as 
from 2007 to 2008 the median score for the failed sample dropped to 16.47; a slight dip that was not 
in the mean scores. 
Table 9 does not show statistically significant results, with the exception of the Kruskal Wallis test 
showing a significant difference at the 5% level in 2009. As the control sample appears to use fewer 
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personal pronouns (from 2005 to 2010, which accounts for six of the eight years examined), H2A 
was not tentatively supported. 
6.2.3 Use of negative words – calendar timeline 
We will now examine H3A, in the calendar timeline sample. 
H3A: The use of negative emotive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 10: Summary of the use of negative emotives (calendar time sample) 
 
Failed  
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010 -8.09 -6.93 4 -1.57 -16.94 0.54 
2009 -5.43 -4.12 5 2.35 -16.98 *0.06 
2008 -16.13 -17.79 8 -6.65 -28.12 0.34 
2007 -19.60 -17.91 18 -6.65 -43.14 **0.03 
2006 -17.53 -14.14 20 -4.68 -70.58 0.10 
2005 -17.98 -16.00 23 -6.00 -43.22 0.26 
2004 -16.89 -16.22 21 -8.55 -30.90 *0.06 
2003 -14.74 -14.84 16 -7.44 -23.74 ***0.00 
2002 -9.91 -9.90 8 -3.12 -16.44 ***0.00 
 
Control  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis 
Test (P-
value) 
2010 -6.78 -7.02 9 2.35 -15.22 0.75 
2009 -10.75 -7.94 10 -0.64 -29.42 0.11 
2008 -6.04 -6.31 10 2.35 -13.92 ***0.00 
2007 -8.31 -9.72 8 4.32 -15.10 ***0.00 
2006 -7.22 -6.65 9 0.88 -15.10 ***0.00 
2005 -8.52 -8.94 8 0.56 -17.42 ***0.00 
2004 -9.43 -9.19 8 -0.68 -14.08 **0.02 
2003 -6.33 -5.68 7 0.46 14.08 ***0.00 
2002 -7.59 -6.65 3 -4.68 -11.44 0.47 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 19: Use of negative emotives in the calendar time sample – mean scores 
 
Figure 20: Use of negative emotives in the calendar time sample – median scores 
 
Figures 19 and 20 look at the use of negative words used by the both the failed and control samples. 
As described in a previous section, a higher score indicates the negativity of the author, which prior 
literature suggests is linked to the deceptiveness of the author. The score break-up is as follows: 
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+  Hardship (Optimism) 
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- Praise (Optimism) 
- Satisfaction (Optimism) 
- Inspiration (Optimism) 
Overall Figure 19 shows that the failed sample is more negative than the control sample, and 
appears to remain more negative in the entire period examined, due to the higher mean scores 
returned. In contrast to Figure 19, Figure 20 shows that in 2002 the control sample returned a higher 
score, which would make them appear to be more deceptive except for the year 2009.  In general, 
Figures 19 shows a significant decreasing trend for the failed sample from 2002 to 2007, and 
despite a slight fluctuation in year 2006. However, in 2009, the use of negative words score spikes 
up to -5.43, a sharp increase from -16.13 in the previous year. The trend reverts back to a decrease, 
and the score drops back down to -8.09 in 2010. Likewise, Figure 20 shows a similar result, with 
more fluctuations in both the failed and control samples. 
The t-test yielded statistical significant results in 2002 and 2003, and mild significant results in 
2004 and 2009 at the 10% level, and 2007 at the 5% level using the t-test. This is in contrast to the 
relative timeline test (section 6.1), in which all 6 years to the year of collapse were statistically 
significant. The Kruskal Wallis test disagrees with the standard t-test to some extent and found 
strong statistical differences in 2003 and 2005 to 2008 in the use of negative words, and mild 
statistical difference in 2004. In contrast, the t-test only found strong significant results in 2002 and 
2003. Overall, as shown in Table 10 and Figures 19 and 20, as the failed sample returned lower 
mean and median negative emotive scores in most of the years examined, there were no grounds to 
tentatively support H3A.  
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6.2.4 Use of descriptive words – calendar timeline 
This section examines H4A and how the descriptive word usage changes in the calendar timeline 
sample. 
H4A: The use of sensory descriptive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly higher than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 11: Summary of the use of descriptive words (calendar time sample) 
 
Failed   
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of Difference 
 (P-value) 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010 44.14 48.16 4 70.26 10.00 0.26 
2009 39.96 34.23 5 66.80 21.91 *0.07 
2008 63.01 68.00 8 111.23 10.50 ***0.00 
2007 42.56 40.91 18 76.65 13.50 *0.06 
2006 39.24 33.04 20 91.52 13.00 0.62 
2005 46.06 41.83 23 117.91 15.00 **0.02 
2004 35.93 33.21 21 94.23 15.00 0.72 
2003 28.07 28.19 16 39.70 15.25 0.22 
2002 25.41 24.9 8 39.84 16.23 0.62 
 
Control   
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal Wallis Test  
(P-value) 
2010 40.61 34.82 9 77.08 15.00 0.87 
2009 44.07 36.24 10 97.44 24.21 0.80 
2008 31.50 32.35 10 49.21 12.29 **0.03 
2007 32.70 27.33 8 64.55 14.91 0.13 
2006 37.25 32.92 9 64.55 21.83 0.83 
2005 35.27 35.28 8 60.84 14.91 0.29 
2004 31.42 30.70 8 47.73 14.63 0.51 
2003 39.57 36.99 7 72.23 22.42 0.15 
2002 32.95 33.00 3 52.00 13.87 0.53 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 21: Use of descriptive words in the calendar time sample – mean scores 
 
Figure 22: Use of descriptive words in the calendar time sample – median scores 
 
Figures 21 and 22 show the use of descriptive words scores, and measures how much information 
the author provides about a particular activity. The higher the score, the more descriptive the 
prospectus, and therefore the more deceptive they appear to be. The Score is derived from the 
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0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010F
re
qu
en
cy
 
o
f d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
w
o
rd
s
Calendar year
Use of Descriptive Words - Mean Scores
Failed
Control
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
o
f d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
w
o
rd
s
Calendar year
Use of Descriptive Words - Median Scores
Failed
Control
103 
 
+ Accomplishment (Activity) 
+ Communication (Activity) 
+ Motion (Activity) 
+ Sensory (User Created – see Appendix II) 
+ Cognitive Terms (Activity) 
From 2002 to 2004, the control sample appears to be more descriptive (and therefore more 
‘deceptive’) than the failed sample. However, this reverses from 2004 to 2009, where the failed 
sample has a higher use of descriptive words score. This is evident in both Figures 23 and 24, where 
the ranges for the mean and median scores for the failed samples were 35.93 to 39.96 and 33.21 to 
34.23 respectively, in comparison to the control sample mean and median scores, which are 31.42 
to 44.07 and 30.70 to 36.24 respectively. Throughout 2002 to 2010, there is an increasing trend in 
the failed sample, with the failed finance companies providing more information over time. In 2005 
and 2008, the use of descriptive words scores spiked, at 46.06 and 63.01 respectively in mean 
scores, and 41.83 and 68.00 in the median scores.  
Overall, the mean and median scores portray the same story, with the control sample providing 
more information in the first two years, 2002 to 2003, and later in 2009. The only difference is the 
sharper spikes in 2008 and 2010 in the median scores. In terms of statistical significance, the usage 
of descriptive words had strong statistical significance at the 1% level in 2008, and mild and weak 
significance in 2005, and 2007 and 2009 respectively. This shows that although the failed sample to 
provide more information in four of the nine years examined and therefore there appears to be 
support for H4A. 
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6.2.5 Use of exclusion and causation words – calendar timeline 
This section examines H5A in the calendar timeline sample. 
H5A:  The use of exclusive words in narrative disclosures by a failed company is 
significantly lower than that of disclosures by non-failed companies. 
Table 12: Summary of the use of exclusive and causation words (calendar time sample) 
 
Failed  
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of Difference  
(P-value) 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010 43.50 44.50 4 72 13 0.92 
2009 43.40 51.00 5 60 20 0.49 
2008 40.87 40.00 8 68 16 0.48 
2007 33.78 32.50 18 66 8 *0.07 
2006 29.40 26.00 20 70 10 0.15 
2005 31.83 25.00 23 85 12 ***0.00 
2004 26.00 26.00 21 490 5 ***0.00 
2003 20.88 20.00 16 40 11 **0.02 
2002 16.75 12.50 8 38 5 **0.01 
 
Control  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal Wallis Test 
 (P-value) 
2010 30.67 26.00 9 60 9 0.44 
2009 38.20 33.50 10 85 19 0.58 
2008 23.90 17.00 10 63 8 **0.02 
2007 21.87 19.50 8 47 11 *0.08 
2006 24.33 18.00 9 48 16 0.49 
2005 24.12 20.00 8 48 11 0.24 
2004 21.44 20.00 8 41 12 0.27 
2003 26.43 23.00 7 42 -15 0.20 
2002 15.33 17.00 3 18 11 0.91 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 23: Use of exclusive and causation words in the calendar time sample – mean scores                                                                       
 
Figure 24: Use of exclusive and causation words in the calendar time sample – median scores         
 
The use of exclusion and causation score measures the frequency of restrictive words such as 
‘however’, and ‘except for’, and reason words such as ‘because’ and ‘for that reason’. Prior 
literature asserts that a deceptive company will use fewer exclusive and causation words to avoid 
creating unnecessary restrictions that may contradict their version of events. Therefore, a deceptive 
prospectus should contain fewer exclusive and causation words, and therefore a lower score. The 
score is a word count of the relevant words: 
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= Exclusion and Causation (User defined – see Appendix I) 
Figures 23 and 24 show the mean and median scores for the Use of Exclusive and Causation words, 
which is measured by a word count. The failed sample returned higher scores from 2004 onwards, 
with the mean and median scores ranging between 26.00 to 43.50 and 26.00 to 44.50 respectively, 
in comparison to 21.44 to 30.67 and 20.00 to 26.00 for the control sample respectively. In the first 
two years however, the control sample returned higher median scores (17.00 and 23.00 in 
comparison to 12.50 and 20.00 respectively by the failed sample), indicating that in the first two 
years of the study the control sample provided more information. 
Overall, both Figures 23 and 24 show an increasing trend for the failed sample, with the failed 
finance companies using more exclusive and causation words from 2002 to 2010. The median score 
(Figure 24) shows a spike in 2009 for the failed sample, in which the Use of Exclusive and 
Causation Score jumped to 51.00. By the next year, 2010, the score settles back down to 44.50. 
Although the control sample did not return an obvious trend, in both the mean and median scores, 
after fluctuations in 2003 and 2009, the score appears to be increasing with time. Tables 12 show 
statistically significant results, with the t-test returning  two statistically significant readings at the 
1% level in 2004 and 2005, and mild statistical differences at the 5% level in 2002 and 2003, and at 
the 10% level in 2007. This was not supported by the Kruskal Wallis test where only two years 
returned significant results. Overall, this study had predicted fewer uses of exclusive and causation 
words by the failed sample. Based on this, the failed sample appears to use more exclusive and 
causation words. Therefore, H5A is not supported. 
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6.2.6 Use of words signalling uncertainty – calendar timeline 
This section examines H6A, which looks at the tone of uncertainty, in the calendar timeline. 
H6A:  The degree of certainty in narrative disclosures by a distressed company is 
significantly less than that of disclosures by non-distressed companies. 
Table 13: Summary of words signalling uncertainty (calendar time sample) 
 
Failed  
 Mean Median Count Max Min 
T-test of 
Difference 
(P-value) 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
2010  -732.89  -570.67  4  -106.41  -1683.80  0.34  
2009  -420.26  -332.46  5  -73.55  -1030.00  0.75  
2008  -723.44  -640.36  8  -106.60  -1370.46  **0.01  
2007  -494.70  -240.30  18  -63.30  -1647.76  0.07  
2006  -268.34  -203.50  20  -78.50  -1318.15  0.81  
2005  -346.71  -242.20  23  -54.70  -1778.20  0.09  
2004  -300.09  -200.50  23  -73.06  -1771.70  0.07  
2003  -169.20  -158.57  18  -57.60  -334.20  0.38  
2002  -144.50  -119.35  8  -63.60  -360.40  0.94  
 
Control  
Y
ea
rs
 
 
 
Mean Median Count Max Min 
Kruskal 
Wallis Test 
(P-value) 
2010  -322.71  -238.60  9  -101.60  -1081.30  0.44  
2009  -518.61  -200.35  10  -105.40  -2638.45  0.90  
2008  -215.90  -143.45  10  -56.20  -753.30  **0.02  
2007  -201.53  -93.05  8  -64.80  -880.70  **0.01  
2006  -222.57  -144.00  9  -39.40  -877.00  0.60  
2005  -180.82  -149.25  8  -51.20  -355.40  0.32  
2004  -152.22  -121.60  8  -67.20  -400.70  **0.04  
2003  -229.51  -198.61  7  -68.80  569.10  0.41  
2002  -138.93  -98.30  3  -61.50  -257.00  0.68  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level  
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Figure 25: Use of words signalling uncertainty in the calendar time sample – mean scores 
 
Figure 26: Use of words signalling uncertainty in the calendar time sample – median scores 
 
Although the tone of uncertainty in written communications as a factor of deception as not 
explicitly examined in prior deception literature, this study is of the view that confidence is crucial 
for the survival of finance companies. For that reason the Uncertainty Score makes up the sixth 
component of the deception score examined.  
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= Ambivalence (Certainty)  
-  Levelling (Certainty)  
- Tenacity (Certainty)  
-  Insistence (Certainty)  
-  Numerical Terms (Certainty)  
The greater the score, the more uncertain the author appears to be.  
In the entire period examined, with the exception of 2003 and 2009 for the mean scores, and 2003 
only for the median scores, Figures 25 and 26 shows the failed sample returned lower uncertainty 
scores. Therefore the written communications of the failed sample appear less uncertain, and less 
‘deceptive’ than their control sample counterparts. Interestingly this trend does not reverse in the 
period examined, except for in 2003 and 2009 for the mean score. Table 13 shows the range for the 
mean and median scores to be -144.50 to -732.89, and -119.35 to -640.36 respectively for the failed 
sample, and -138.93 to -518.61, and -93.05 to -238.60 respectively for the control sample.  
Figures 25 and 26 show a very smooth decrease for the failed sample from 2002 to 2010, as the tone 
of their corporate communications began to appear more certain as the full effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis unfolded. The control sample follows a similar decreasing trend. Although Figure 
25 shows that the mean score for the control sample shows an overall decrease, in 2003 and 2009 
the score dipped severely, to -229.51 and -518.62 respectively. In 2008 the mean and median 
uncertainty score for the failed sample dipped severely to -723.44 and -640.36 respectively, with the 
control sample following suit one year later in 2009. However, in 2009 the failed sample shot back 
up, before plunging to another low in 2010. Aside from the mentioned major fluctuations, there 
appears to be a decreasing trend for both the failed and control sample. The spread between in the 
maximum and minimum scores indicate that the tone of uncertainty between the different failed 
finance companies varies significantly; however, generally, the failed sample appears to use certain 
words.  
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Differences in the use of uncertain words returned no significant result for all years bar 2008, where 
the level of significance was at the 5% level using the t-test. Using the Kruskal Wallis test strong 
statistical differences at the 5% level was noted in in 2004 to 2007, and 2008.Overall, the degree of 
uncertainty for the failed sample appears to be lower, indicated by the lower uncertainty score of the 
distressed sample. On this basis, H6A is tentatively not supported. 
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7. Discussion           
This section examines the results of the variables in detail and draws from prior literature to 
ascertain rationales for the study’s findings. Hypotheses for which support was not found is first 
discussed, followed by the hypotheses for which support as found. The unique nature of finance 
companies – the relationship between financial health and investor confidence, appeared to be an 
important factor in the lack of support for the hypotheses. This affected the motives to deceive and 
the subsequent disclosure strategies employed by failed finance companies. 
7.1 Summary of differences – relative timeline 
Table 14 summarises the differences of the five components between the two samples using the 
standard t-test, and reinforces the significant differences shown by Figures 3 to 14. Generally there 
is some evidence supporting statistical differences between the failed and non-failed samples in the 
use of personal pronouns, descriptive words, and exclusive and causation words. The use of 
negative words returned statistically significant differences in all the years, with most at the 1% 
level. In contrast, Table 15 shows the summary of difference using the Kruskal Wallis test which, as 
previously discussed, is a more powerful statistical tool as it is non-parametric in nature. The 
Kruskal Wallis test could not find the statistically significant results identified by the standard t test, 
although similarities in the use of personal pronouns and negative emotives were noted.  
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In summary: 
H1A Is not provisionally supported  
H2A Is not provisionally supported 
H3A Is not provisionally supported 
H4A Is not provisionally supported 
H5A Is not provisionally supported 
H6A Is not provisionally supported 
 
Table 14: Summary of differences – T Test 
 H1A: 
Deception 
Score 
H2A: 
Personal 
Pronouns 
H3A: 
Negative 
Words 
H4A:  
Descriptive 
H5A: 
Exclusive/ 
Causation 
H6A: 
Uncertainty 
-6 0.33 0.05* 0.00*** 0.02** 0.39 0.60  
-5 0.34 0.78 0.00*** 0.57 0.53 0.37  
-4 0.49 0.04** 0.00*** 0.97 0.99 0.60  
-3 0.23 0.13 0.00*** 0.06* 0.12 0.26  
-2 0.06* 0.72 0.01** 0.89 0.09* 0.06 * 
-1 0.29 0.06* 0.00*** 0.62 0.04** 0.44  
0 0.91 0.72 0.03** 0.03** 0.11 0.93  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
Table 15: Summary of differences – Kruskal Wallis test 
 H1A: 
Deception 
Score 
H2A: 
Personal 
Pronouns 
H3A: 
Negative 
Words 
H4A:  
Descriptive 
H5A: 
Exclusive/ 
Causation 
H6A: 
Uncertainty 
-6 0.39 0.09* 0.02** 0.60 0.27 0.51  
-5 0.22 0.05 0.03** 0.80 0.60 0.50  
-4 0.14 0.24 0.00*** 0.37 0.13 0.27  
-3 0.18 0.04** 0.07* 0.76 0.69 0.27  
-2 0.96 0.43 0.00*** 0.74 0.57 0.34  
-1 0.57 0.76 0.06* 0.38 0.22 0.41  
0 0.08* 0.54 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.46  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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7.2 Summary of differences – calendar timeline 
Tables 16 and 17 (shown on the next page) summarise the differences of the five components 
between the two samples, and reinforces the significant differences shown by Figures 15 to 26. 
Generally there is evidence supporting statistical differences using the t-test between failed and 
non-failed companies in the deception score. Components that show some statistically significant 
differences include the usage of negative emotives, descriptive words, and exclusive and causation 
words. In contrast, the Kruskal Wallis test did not find the statically significant results to support 
H4A, H5A and H6A, with no years returning significant differences at the 1% level. The Kruskal 
Wallis test also found significant results in the difference of use of negative emotives. 
In summary: 
H1A Is not provisionally supported 
H2A Is not provisionally supported 
H3A Is not provisionally supported 
H4A Is provisionally supported 
H5A Is not provisionally supported 
H6A Is not provisionally supported   
114 
  
Table 16: Summary of differences – T Test (calendar time sample) 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
Table 17: Summary of differences – Kruskal Wallis test (calendar time sample) 
 H1A: 
Deception 
Score 
H2A: 
Personal 
Pronouns 
H3A: 
Negative 
Words 
H4A: 
Descriptive 
H5A: 
Exclusive/ 
Causation 
H6A: 
Uncertainty 
2010 0.41 1.00 0.75 0.87 0.44 0.44  
2009 0.54 0.02** 0.11 0.80 0.58 0.90  
2008 0.02** 0.82 0.00*** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02 ** 
2007 0.24 0.96 0.00*** 0.13 0.08* 0.01 ** 
2006 0.22 0.81 0.00*** 0.83 0.49 0.60  
2005 0.02** 0.5 0.00*** 0.29 0.24 0.32  
2004 0.01** 0.18 0.02** 0.51 0.27 0.04**  
2003 1.00 0.17 0.00*** 0.15 0.20 0.41  
2002 0.54 0.75 0.47 0.53 0.91 0.68  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
7.3 Alternative hypotheses that were supported 
The paper finds evidence to support one of the alternate hypotheses proposed. Prior literature (for 
example Hancock et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & 
Tayan, 2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004) suggests that deceivers will attempt to 
substantiate their version of events with more information. As expected by the current study, the 
frequency of descriptive words of the failed and control samples increased over both the relative 
and calendar timelines. Interestingly, we did not find failing companies using fewer exclusive or 
causation words, rather, an increasing trend was found. This tends to suggest that in times of 
 H1A: 
Deception 
Score 
H2A:  
Personal  
Pronouns 
H3A: 
Negative 
Words 
H4A:  
Descriptive 
H5A: 
Exclusive/ 
Causation 
H6A:  
Uncertainty 
2010 0.07 0.67 0.54 0.26 0.92 0.34  
2009 0.78 0.33 0.06* 0.07* 0.49 0.75  
2008 0.00*** 0.37 0.34 0.00*** 0.48 0.01**  
2007 0.00*** 0.61 0.03** 0.06* 0.07* 0.07  
2006 0.31 0.77 0.10 0.62 0.15 0.81  
2005 0.00*** 0.99 0.26 0.02** 0.00*** 0.09  
2004 0.00*** 0.39 0.06* 0.72 0.00*** 0.07  
2003 0.29 0.12 0.00*** 0.22 0.02** 0.38  
2002 0.63 0.77 0.00*** 0.62 0.01** 0.94  
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financial difficulties, finance companies feel the need to win back the confidence of their investors 
by more floral descriptions; more ‘evidence’ to substantiate their possible untruths. For non-failed 
companies, this could be as ‘harmless’ as the chief representative providing words of relief to ease 
investors into their continual investment. 
Figure 27: Distribution of failed prospectuses vs. word count  
 
However, for failed companies, this could be harmful deception, as a means to substantiate their 
false version of reality. This view was borne out by further analysis.  When the distribution of failed 
prospectuses was mapped against the actual word count (see Figure 27), we find that during the 
years where the failing finance companies collapsed, the word count for those two years (2008 and 
2010) actually spiked to 832 and 780 respectively. This could signal the very desperate and 
ultimately vain attempts of the chief representative to win back investor confidence. The increase in 
words attributed solely to the increase in lies (i.e. deceptive disclosures) is detrimental to all users of 
financial and non-financial information. This highlights the issue of narrative disclosures, as 
company financial disclosures are becoming increasingly difficult to digest due to the overload of 
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information (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990). In this situation, the words of the chief representative, 
when in plain English, appears more inviting to read (Henry, 2008). The increase in deceptive 
communications has severe consequences for not only invertors, but regulators and consequently 
the finance companies themselves. Narrative portions of corporate disclosures are currently 
unregulated and heavily controlled by management (Geppert and Lawrence, 2008). How should the 
regulators regulate the registered prospectuses, as they are designed to be the “principal point of 
sale document” (Securities Commission, 2005 p.5), and not an unbiased account of the financial 
affairs (Benschop and Meihuizen, 2002). As alluded to by KPMG (2007), attempts by firms to 
comply with all existing necessary regulations of the registered prospectuses and investment 
statements could increase the total length of the document to well over seventy pages in length, and 
compromising users’ understanding.  
7.4 Alternative hypotheses that were not supported 
Overall, the results were not as expected for the overall deception score, with the failed sample 
generally returning lower and therefore less deceptive scores than the control sample in the relative 
timeline analysis. This is an interesting result, with both intuitive and counter intuitive facets. 
Intuitively, finance companies in bona fide financial distress (i.e., the failed sample) should appear 
more deceptive as they have more motivation to produce deceptive narratives, possibly as a means 
of ensuring their own survival. However, in the study they returned lower and therefore ‘less 
deceptive’ mean and median scores than their non-failed counterparts in six of the seven years 
examined. A possible rationale for this relates back to the definition of ‘deception’ in Section 240 (2) 
of the Crimes Act 1961:  
“[A] false representation, whether oral, documentary, or by conduct whereby the person 
making the representation intends to deceive any other person and know that it is false in a 
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material particular; or is reckless as to whether it is false in a material particular; or an 
omission to disclose a material particular…[emphasis added]”  
As the key element of the definition is the word “intends”, this indicates that the misrepresentation 
in narratives is a deliberate move by the author. As it is a deliberate move, detection may not be as 
simple as an analysis of word choice. The fundamental notion of the Interpersonal Deception 
Theory (See Buller et al., 1994) assumes that based on feedback by the receiver, deceivers will 
adapt their behaviour so as to not arouse suspicion. Although this notion was not derived from 
written media, or rather, face-to-face interviews or experiments, as the chairman and CEOs’ letters 
are reviewed by many parties beforehand, these reviews will bring up feedback which will help 
shape the communication in a way that the lies are more cleverly concealed. In effect, the failed 
sample may have returned a lower deception score as they artificially adjust their word choice to 
enhance their image. A closer examination of the individual components of the deception score 
reveals the extent the intention to deceive can distort the word usage of communications of finance 
companies. 
The study’s relative and calendar timeline analyses indicate that the failed sample did not use fewer 
personal pronouns, more negative emotive terms than the control sample. This seems to be in 
contrast with some prior findings. For example, Bournois and Point (2006) found that the bulk of 
the CEOs in their study take credit for favourable results while unfavourable results are blamed on 
external economic climate. Extensive uses of the word “we” can imply that authors do not want to 
assume responsibility for the action. Craig et al. (2012) share similar findings. They found the 
reduction in personal pronouns to be a deliberate move as a subtle change in blame. Based on prior 
psychology and linguistic literature, the researcher had hypothesized that emotional discomfort 
from deceptive behaviour may cause the deceiver to subconsciously use more negative words 
(Hancock et al., 2005, 2007; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 
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2010; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004). The nervousness, and to some extent, discomfort of 
the author were also found to increase as the stakes were raised (Caso et al., 2005). Therefore, as we 
approach the date of collapse, we should see an increase in the use of negative emotive words. 
Craig et al. (2012) found that the level of confidence expressed in the CEO letters they examined 
declined in the early stages of financial distress, then staying constant at a lower level. Kwon and 
Wild (1994) supports this and notes that financial distress is an important environmental factor 
affecting the usefulness of accounting disclosures. The authors found that the level of market 
uncertainty is greater as a firm nears financial distress. However, the current study finds 
contradicting results, and the special nature of the companies studied helps explains these 
discrepancies. 
In terms of degree of certainty, although the failed sample returned lower and therefore more certain 
words than the control sample, the difference is not significantly different. Moreover, the degree of 
uncertainty actually decreases drastically for the distress sample in the years leading to the collapse. 
Looking at the five components of uncertainty in Table 18, the largest and most influential component is 
‘Insistence’. Insistence measures “repetition of words, as repetition of words indicates preference of an 
ordered world" (Hart, 2000). As a particular message is reiterated and repeated, this reduces the 
uncertainty or doubt attached to it. It is deducted from Ambivalence and the greater the Insistence score, 
the smaller the Uncertainty score will become. If one is being deceptive, it is unlikely they will put 
conviction to particular statements. From years -6 to 0 there is an increasing trend in the Insistence score, 
possibly due to the increasingly dire financial situation of the company, requiring confident messages 
from the chief representative in a possible ‘last resort’ attempt to win back investors. Overall, although 
the study expected more uncertainty from the failed sample, the opposite result was returned. A possible 
explanation for this may relate back to the nature of the companies examined. As finance companies are 
reliant on the confidence of their investors and the market, any hesitation or vagueness portrayed by the 
authors may ring warning bells for their investors. Signs of uncertainty in a company portrayed by the 
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chief representatives can often be intensified by investors, leading to the loss of confidence and possibly 
expedite the ultimate collapse of the company. 
Table 18: Components of the uncertainty score 
 
Failed 
Y
ea
rs
 
to
 
C
o
lla
ps
e 
Ambivalence Numerical Terms Tenacity Leveling Terms Insistence 
-6  1.85 -22.33 -14.91 -4.00 -161.24 
-5  4.39 -28.29 -23.47 -5.59 -387.40 
-4  2.24 -19.86 -17.86 -4.48 -204.18 
-3  3.96 -23.54 -23.60 -6.42 -230.74 
-2  4.00 -29.75 -25.31 -6.95 -281.55 
-1  4.46 -26.52 -30.46 -6.84 -342.45 
0  5.90 -38.50 -37.27 -10.85 -618.13 
 
Control 
Eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t Y
ea
rs
 
Ambivalence Numerical Terms Tenacity Leveling Terms Insistence 
-6  2.29 -25.88 -18.23 -3.13 -136.89 
-5  4.18 -22.89 -22.35 -5.44 -176.08 
-4  3.52 -21.38 -20.76 -4.25 -158.66 
-3  2.98 -27.80 -19.36 -4.00 -169.58 
-2  5.66 -30.30 -31.79 -7.25 -447.53 
-1  2.77 -29.78 -23.99 -4.11 -269.51 
0  2.49 -35.25 -30.08 -5.19 -645.11 
 
The nature of finance companies makes them susceptible to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the 
collapse of the finance company is caused by a mass exit of investors who may be ‘spooked’ by any 
negative received cue, as seen in the banking sector (Linsley & Slack, 2010; Shin, 2009). Consumer 
confidence is vital for finance companies, and positivity for financially distressed companies may 
be beneficial for their survival. The need to reassure their investors overrides many of the other 
effects found in prior literature. Existing literature has found examples of narratives that exhibit 
such optimism. Hildebrandt and Snyder (1981) found positive words to feature more often in annual 
reports of companies, regardless of their financial health. Similarly, Rutherford (2005) found 
evidence of the Pollyanna effect, with loss making companies making more references to ‘profits’ 
than losses, and to the top line of the income statement (i.e. earnings). Boo and Simnett (2002) 
found that financially distressed companies that provided optimistic management prospective 
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comments were less likely to fail within in the next year, in comparison to other financially 
distressed companies. Craig et al. (2012) argues that putting a ‘positive spin’ on narrative 
disclosures is a form of impression management and can enhance the CEO’s personal image. 
Bournois and Point (2006) found half of their sample of CEO letters portrayed a disastrous year 
2002 as favourable, and only a minority included negative aspects in their writing. This is especially 
true for finance companies, where one miscalculation in disclosure strategy may result in the 
collapse of the company. Finance companies have unique characteristics which may lead to results 
which may be in contrast with past findings which are mostly based on Annual Reports.  Results of 
all prior studies using sample firms outside the finance industry may not generalise to the finance 
industry as the latter is driven so much more by investor confidence. Consequently, very subtle 
wording changes could have a profound effect on actions by the users of the registered prospectuses 
(i.e., the investors). After all, the intention of registered prospectuses is to entice the investment of 
both prospective and existing investors which may further motivate the authors of the documents to 
report in a particular manner. This could jeopardize liquidity if the investors choose to pull their 
investment out of the company. Representatives of such firms may be unwilling to make any 
significant deviation in the tone or form of wording from previous periods so as to arouse suspicion.  
Bournois and Point (2006) note that the use of self-references may be very motivational at times, 
and may introduce a positive style of discourse. This could explain why the failed sample in the 
current study returned higher person pronoun scores. The negative emotive scores also show the 
desperation of CEOs to remain more positive for the sake of their survival. Management tend to 
make more disclosures when they have good news, and in particular, positive disclosures (García 
Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). This could be one possible rationale to why the study’s failed 
sample appeared so positive, despite being in bona fide financial distress which should suggest that 
they do not have any ‘good’ news to report on. This could suggest that any ‘good news’, no matter 
how material it is, is given more prominence than the unfavourable news, which may be more 
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important to investors for their decision making. The prominent themes of CEO letters33 are said to 
vary depending on the financial performance of the company (Bournois & Point, 2006). Above all, 
the authors believe that negative results are not supposed to appear in CEO statements, and CEOs 
will adapt the prominent themes to suit the financial situation. The nature of finance companies may 
also be an attributing factor. As finance companies are reliant on the confidence of their investors 
and the market, signs of trouble from the authors may ring warning bells for their investors. Any 
significant risks detected by investors may trigger the self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to the 
ultimate collapse of the company. 
The lack of significant differences in the study’s results does not suggest that the chief 
representatives of the failed sample appeared ignorant of their self-image. Traces of ‘hubris’, a form 
of “self-deception or egocentric bias” (p.170 Craig & Brennan, 2012) may have been present. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the lax entry requirements of New Zealand’s non-bank sector provided a 
‘boom’ of NBDT in the market, accounting for quite a notable portion of the country’s GDP within 
a short time frame (Economic Intelligence, 2007). This may have fuelled the confidence of the chief 
representatives, possibly to a point where they did not see, and did not want to see, their impending 
demise. Overall, in the current study it is shown that entities and individuals with strong incentives 
to deceive do communicate differently than those with less incentive to deceive, particularly with 
respect to changes in the tone and style of written communications. This supports findings of prior 
literature (for example, Amernic & Craig, 2006, 2010; Craig et al., 2012; Sydserff & Weetman, 
2002 to name a few.) In particular, deceivers do become more descriptive, and hence use more 
words when deceiving. However, they are found to not use fewer personal pronouns, exclusion and 
causation words, and more negative emotive words. The different legislative requirements of the 
Securities Act 1978 (governs registered prospectuses) and Financial Reporting Act 1993 (governs 
Annual Reports) may also have moderated the content of the disclosures. The Securities Act 
                                                 
33
 Which are: the market, growth, strategic plans, product mix, imminent losses, future profits, confidence, the results 
for the year, assertion of optimism about the future (Bournois & Point, 2006). 
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imposes harsh penalties for breaches34 which may serve as incentive not to include misleading 
messages in the narrative disclosures. 
Craig et al. (2012)  assert that the general assumption from theories that underpin deception is that it 
is an intended action done to achieve a desired outcome, whether at an individual or organisational 
level. Using this argument, the motivation is particularly strong for finance companies. From a 
personal perspective (agency and impression management theories as described in Craig et al. 
(2012)), CEOs have their own name and ego at stake to report deceptively.  It is detrimental to their 
own status to represent a failing company. From an organisational level (stakeholder theory, as 
described in Craig et al. (2012)), they possibly have stronger motivation to report deceptively for 
the survival of their organisation, as finance companies are dependent on the confidence of their 
investors. In the end, the survival of the organisation will also impact on the CEOs at a personal 
level. Since May 2012, the newly established Financial Markets Authority investigated 26 of the 57 
failed finance companies (Financial Markets Authority, 2011a), and have since referred nine cases 
to the courts for gross misconduct. This suggests that some companies in the failed sample were 
indeed deceitful in their communications, whether picked up by the study’s current model or not. 
However, there is no guarantee that companies not flagged by the Financial Markets Authority are 
‘not deceptive’ – they may simply have not been ‘caught out’. South Canterbury Finance is an 
example of a stellar performer in the market until the fraudulent practices were uncovered.  
The findings of the study support the notion that deception detection is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible (Carlson et al., 2004; Hobson et al., 2011). As regulation surrounding narrative portions 
of registered prospectuses is vague35, it gives the authors full discretion on what to include, and 
what to omit, helping them mould changes to their desired image (García Osma & Guillamón-
                                                 
34
 Section 55F(1) of the Securities Act 1978 states that the maximum amount of a pecuniary penalty is $500,000 for an 
individual and $5,000,000 for a body corporate, for each civil liability event. 
35
 The Securities Act 1978 defines ‘false and misleading’ statements as those that fail to refer, or give proper emphasis, 
to adverse circumstances (s34 (1)).  These adverse circumstances could be offset by false assurances by the chief 
representative. 
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Saorín, 2011). This can impede the detection of deception, as the authors have flexibility over what 
they choose to disclose, and how they disclose it. These are possible weaknesses to the current 
study, and the researcher acknowledges these difficulties. However we have found that cues of 
deception can be identified in the early stages of financial distress through analysis of word use. 
Purda and Skillicorn (2012) found that firms start to become less truthful (i.e. more deceitful) 
around three quarters prior to the actual fraudulent event. This seems to echo Anderson and Chang 
(2011) and Frino et al. (2007), who found that news of financial distress is often known to the 
market, and the effects felt, before the actual official announcement. Financial misrepresentation is, 
despite how it is often portrayed particularly in terms of finance companies, a relatively uncommon 
event (Purda & Skillicorn, 2012). In contrast, in the current study it is shown that a high proportion 
of the population of finance companies had failed. However, Purda and Skillicorn (2012) excluded 
finance companies in their research, so their findings may not be applicable.  
Time and resource constraints make up the major limitations of the research. However, such effect 
is minimised to ensure that fundamental assumptions of the research are not impaired and the 
impact they have on the empirical findings is kept to a minimum. The first limitation is the limited 
scope and size of the research, which included 189 prospectuses from 59 finance companies. This is 
mainly due to the availability of information, as some prospectuses did not include a narrative 
portion in their prospectuses. However, as discussed in section 5.1.1, there are prominent literatures 
in the field of financial distress which is based on small sample sizes36. Potential bias may be 
introduced in the selection the subcomponents to define each variable of the deception score, and 
consequently, the composition of the deception score. The selection of words in each dictionary of 
the variables tested may also introduce more bias. This is particularly so in the user defined 
dictionaries set up to test H4A and H5A. As it is not possible to compile a comprehensive list for the 
linguistic software to check through, such effect is mitigated by including as many words as 
                                                 
36
 For example, see Altman (1968) 
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possible in the user defined dictionaries. There were no changes to the other dictionaries for the 
variables, which is the same approach used by other studies such as Linsley and Slack (2010) and 
Yuthas et al. (2002), which used DICTION in its default setting. This is appropriate so as to not 
introduce more bias into the study. 
Although this study contributes to some of the gaps left by existing literature in the field of 
deception in narratives, there are future research opportunities which stem from the results of the 
study. An in-depth examination of the relationship between the negative tone of narratives and the 
financial health of the company should be examined. Using prior literature the study posits that 
financially failing and deceitful finance companies will appear more negative in their narratives. 
However, the results from the study contradict this notion, and at a statistically significant level. 
Another interpretation for such a contradicting result could be that it is deceptive to be reporting 
significantly more positively when the financial health of the company is failing. This is an area 
worthy of future research indeed. The main assumption of the study is that bona fide financially 
distressed companies, measured by their actual failure, are more prone to using deceptive reporting 
measures to appear positively to continue their survival. It would be interesting to see whether non-
failed companies also employ such deceptive reporting strategies to enhance their performance to 
appear relatively more favourable and to further capitalise on their position in minds of investors.  
Investor sophistication is another interesting area that future research should consider. The majority 
of the investors affected by the GFC were “mum and dad” investors, with little knowledge and 
experience in dealing with investments. This may have affected the extent of narrative disclosures 
provided by the stricken companies, and the messages the narrative disclosures may have held.   
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8. Conclusion           
In light of the GFC and the billions of dollars in lost investments, this study examines whether 
deception played a role in the collapse of the finance sector in New Zealand. Using the computer- 
assisted text analysis programme, DICTION, this study examines five cues of deception prescribed 
by existing psychology and linguistic literatures. Looking at the entire population of registered 
prospectuses from failed finance companies with available information in the Companies Register, 
this study found interesting results that complement, and contradict existing literature. Language is 
an important factor to examine in deception detection. Deceitful people may communicate 
differently than non-deceitful people, particularly with respect to changes in the tone and the style 
of written communications (Amernic & Craig, 2006, 2010; Craig et al., 2012; Sydserff & Weetman, 
2002). The study finds support for Larcker and Zakolyukina (2011) that “…the language 
composition of true narratives differs from that of false narratives” (p. 2). In terms of the variables 
tested, the study did not found support for most of the hypotheses tested. This can suggest that 
authors of deceitful written communications are often well aware of the consequences the 
disclosure of the company’s real financial health may bring. Deceivers knowingly try to positively 
portray their poor performance, while concealing their mismanagement and/or misdeeds (Craig et 
al., 2012). However, deception detection is difficult  (Carlson et al., 2004; Hobson et al., 2011) as 
reports are compiled and reviewed by many individuals, often including those who are unaware of 
fraud, and therefore have no intention to deceive (Purda & Skillicorn, 2012). Methods of 
perpetrating deception are adaptive by nature, with no clear cut ‘cues’ of deceptive behaviour as 
deceivers adapt to remain ‘legitimate’. 
In a number of areas the study found results contradictory to prior findings. In particular, the failed 
sample did not use significantly fewer personal pronouns and fewer negative emotive terms than 
non-failed firms in the lead up to collapse. In the relative timeline we find support for the notion 
that failed finance companies will use more causation or exclusive words. However, findings from 
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the calendar timeline were not consistent with these results in all areas. Both the relative and 
calendar timelines found that failed and non-failed finance companies will be more descriptive in 
their written media, as we had hypothesised. A possible explanation for the contradictory findings is 
that the theories and assumptions that underpinned the hypotheses were based on research drawn 
from psychology, linguistics and accounting studies dedicated to Annual Reports. Such assumptions 
may not apply to registered prospectuses of NBDTs such as finance companies. For example, the 
main aim of the registered prospectus is different to that of the annual report. The registered 
prospectus is designed to entice and encourage potential investors, whereas the annual report is 
designed to report and account to existing investors. They are therefore governed by different 
legislation. The nature of finance companies is also different, as the confidence of investors not 
only guarantees the source of capital, but their survival as well. Wording choice could potentially 
have immediate and profound impacts in the credibility-based finance industry. If investors 
interpret the registered prospectuses in a way that is detrimental to the company (i.e., if they find 
unfavourable news regarding performance, or if they cannot take the at their face value), they may 
choose to pull their invested capital out. Prior studies may not be able to be generalised to the 
finance industry and prospectus-like disclosures.  
A number of inconclusive results found in this study emphasises the significant gaps identified in 
the literature. It was found that behavioural traits for deceivers found in the psychology and 
linguistic literature may not be able to be generalised to fit all types of deceivers. These type of 
studies typically examined verbal based communications such as transcripts of interviews (Hancock 
et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2010; Larcker & 
Zakolyukina, 2011; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004) which, as discussed earlier, may not be 
applicable to written, formal corporate disclosures reviewed by many parties. The registered 
prospectus is different to the Annual Report, with different underlying aims. Additional research in 
deception in narratives is essential, particularly with regards to accounting disclosures where the 
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deceiver is trying to deceive multiple audiences, with differing levels of sophistication. The study’s 
inconclusive results also show that deception detection is difficult, supporting papers such as Purda 
and Skillicorn (2012), Carlson et al. (2004) and Hobson et al. (2011). It is said that 11% of frauds 
go undetected by either quantitative or qualitative models, indicating that a mixed approach of both 
models can severely reduce letting financial misrepresentations go un-noticed (Purda & Skillicorn, 
2012). Even though strong governance reduces the potential for deception to occur in narratives 
(García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011), ultimately users of such reports should be prudent in 
their interpretation of such communication from the company (Bournois & Point, 2006). The ability 
of voluntary disclosures to achieve the intended effects is largely dependent on the perceived 
credibility of disclosures, which declines with the financial health of the company (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). However, there is a discrepancy between moral and economic motivations to disclose 
information, and management’s self-interest may allow the latter to override the former (Holder-
Webb & Cohen, 2007). Management’s self-interest is a key component in the definition of 
deception, causing the most of the troubles in the GFC, and may be the reason why it is a 
phenomenon that is unlikely to disappear soon. 
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Appendix I – List of Words in Exclusion and Causation Dictionary  
 Exclusion  
afterall be that as it may per contra 
all the same But Withal 
Anyhow Despite without regard to 
Barring for all that Yet 
Besides how be it However 
But in spite of apart from 
excepting nonetheless aside from 
excluding on the other hand Bar 
exclusive of Omitting with the exception of 
exempting outside of Without 
if not Rejecting other than 
Lacking Save Except 
leaving out Saving not for 
 Minus short of exclusive of 
whereas,  for that reason  
 Causation  
Because due to on the grounds that 
As For Over 
as a result of for the reason that owing to 
as long as  for the sake of  Seeing 
as things go in as much as Since 
Being in behalf of thanks to 
by cause of in that Through 
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by reason of in the interest of due to 
by virtue of in view of now that 
considering   
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Appendix II – List of Words in Sensory Dictionary     
round Flat Curved 
wave Wavy Ruffled 
angular Tender Hollow 
tapered Wiry Lopsided 
freckled Wrinkled Striped 
bright Clear Glossy 
jeweled Fiery Shimmering 
muddy Drab Dark 
grimy Worn Cluttered 
fresh Flowery Transparent 
sheer Opaque Muscular 
handsome Robust Fragile 
Pale Perky Lacy 
shadowy Crash Squawk 
crackle Chime Ring 
thud Whine Buzz 
laugh Silence Bump 
Bark Clink Gurgle 
chuckle Boom Bleat 
Hiss Giggle Cry 
thunder Bray Snort 
guffaw Bawled Bang 
blare Bellow Sing 
crow Roar Rumble 
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growl Hum Chatter 
scream Grate Whimper 
mutter Mumble Screech 
Slam Stammer Murmur 
Wail Shout Clap 
snap Whisper Babble 
Yell Stomp Rustle 
Sigh Cheer Whistle 
jangle Whir Hush 
storm Oily Rich 
bland Ripe Buttery 
hearty Tasteless Medicinal 
salty Mellow Sour 
fishy Bitter Sugary 
vinegary Spicy Bittersweet 
Crisp Fruity Hot 
sweet Savory Tangy 
burnt Sweet Piney 
acrid Sickly Scented 
pungent Burnt Stagnant 
fragrant Spicy Gaseous 
musty Aromatic Gamy 
putrid Moldy Perfumed 
fishy Spoiled Dry 
fresh Briny Sour 
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damp Earthy Sharp 
rancid Dank Cool 
Wet Silky Sandy 
Cold Slippery Velvety 
gritty Icy Spongy 
smooth Rough Luke 
warm Mushy Soft 
sharp Tepid Oily 
woolly Thick Warm 
waxy Furry Dry 
hot Fleshy Feathery 
dull Steamy Rubbery 
fuzzy Thin Sticky 
bumpy Hairy Fragile 
damp Crisp Leathery 
  
141 
  
Appendix III – List of finance companies in the failed sample 
Company Year of Collapse Available Prospectuses 
Allied Finance August 2010 4 
Babcock & Brown Ltd June 2009 1 
Bridecorp  July 2007 5 
Bridgecorp Investment July 2007 5 
Capital+Merchant Finance Ltd November 2007 5 
Dominion Finance June 2008 3 
Dorchester June 2008 6 
Equitable Mortgage Limited November 2010 3 
Finance and Leasing January 2011 3 
Geneva Finance October 2007 5 
Hanover Capital July 2008 5 
Hanover Finance July 2008 6 
Irongage Property Limited May 2011 4 
Mascot Finance March 2009 6 
Mutual Finance July 2010 6 
Nathans Finance August 2007 5 
North South Finance June 2008 5 
Numeria December 2007 3 
Provincial Finance June 2006 5 
Rural Portfolio Capital May 2010 5 
South Canterbury Finance August 2010 6 
St Kilda Finance August 2008 6 
St Laurence June 2008 4 
Strata Finance Ltd April 2009 3 
Strategic Finance August 2008 5 
Tower April 2008 2 
United Finance July 2008 7 
Viaduct Capital May 2010 2 
Vision Securities April 2010 2 
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